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On the 22nd January 2018, the US American biopharmaceutical company Celgene Corporation 
announced the signing of a definitive merger agreement with their research partner Juno Therapeutics. 
Both companies have already spent three years working on the development of CAR-T cancer 
therapies which hold the potential to treat life threatening diseases that cannot be fully cured, yet.  
The industry both companies operate in is shaped by intensive regulation, cut throat competition but 
also immense pricing power for suppliers. Various competitors have already engaged in CAR-T 
research, fuelling a race for the best-in-class drug. Celgene has shown industry superior growth in the 
last years at a high dependency on their blockbuster drug REVLIMID®. They have intensified R&D 
spending to build a highly specialized knowledge base for future product development. Juno is a 
young, research driven biotechnology company that has been working on specialized CAR-T research 
with Celgene. However, most of their drug candidates are in early development stages, resulting in 
massive losses and cash burns.  
Prior to the acquisition, Celgene has been priced almost fairly with a slight upside potential. Their 
stand-alone valuation arrives at a top-range share price of $106.60 whilst they traded at $102.65 as 
of 19th January 2018. Juno, on the other hand, traded at a value of $56.50 at the same day, whilst their 
valuation yielded a share price of $48.02 Synergies of up to $10bn have been identified, justifying 
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No passado dia 22 de Janeiro de 2018, a biofarmacêutica norte-americana Celgene Corporation 
anunciou uma decisão de fusão com a sua parceira de pesquisa, a Juno Therapeutics. A parceria 
começou em 2015, no desenvolvimento de terapias CAR-T para tratamento de cancros, que têm o 
potencial para curar doenças fatais ainda não-tratáveis. 
A indústria de ambas é caracterizada por forte regulação e competição intensa, mas também um 
elevado poder negocial para as fornecedoras. Vários competidores já iniciaram pesquisas de terapias 
CAR-T, promovendo uma autêntica batalha para obter o melhor produto no mercado. A Celgene 
demonstrou um crescimento superior à média no passado recente, maioritariamente devido ao seu 
"medicamento estrela" REVLIMID®. A empresa tem intensificado o investimento em I&D para criar 
uma base de conhecimentos para desenvolvimento de produtos, altamente especializada. A Juno é 
uma jovem biotecnológica especializada em pesquisa, que tem vindo desenvolver pesquisas em 
terapias CAR-T especializadas com a Celgene. Muitos dos produtos candidatos estão ainda numa 
fase inicial, o que se traduz em perdas significativas. 
Antes da aquisição, a Celgene estava avaliada quase a preço justo, com potencial positivo. Estava 
avaliada em $106.60 por acção, no segmento mais elevado, estando a ser negociada a $102.65 no dia 
19 de Janeiro de 2018. Por outro lado, a Juno estava a ser negociada a $56.50, enquanto que a sua 
avaliação era de $48.02 por acção. Foram identificadas sinergias até $10 biliões, justificando o prémio 
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After years of collaborative research and development, Celgene Corporation (in the following: 
Celgene) announced the signing of a definitive merger agreement with Juno Therapeutics (in the 
following: Juno) on the 22nd January 2018 (2018g). Celgene agreed to buy the remaining 90.30% of 
the company’s equity at a price of $87 per share, paying a total of $9bn in cash. The deal values Juno 
at an equity value of approximately $9.9bn, giving them a premium of about 29% compared to the 
previous day’s market price.  
Celgene justified the deal as an enhancement to their exhaustive biopharmaceutical research platform 
and the potential to add significant long-term revenue growth drivers to their product portfolio. The 
deal follows a wave of technical advancements related to the development of CAR-T cancer treatment 
systems. CAR-T is a technology that holds the potential to treat a variety of oncological diseases that 
cannot be fully cured, yet. From a financial perspective, the transaction promises to bring a highly 
innovative product to a market on which suppliers can gain almost monopolistic pricing power, 
protected by strong, long-term intellectual protection rights. On the other hand, the industry is known 
for a cut-throat competition between small research driven biotech specialists and large 
pharmaceutical conglomerates, which have previously engaged in related fields of research.  
In chapter two, the following paper will give an overview of common equity valuation techniques 
and the general characteristics of Mergers & Acquisitions (in the following: M&A). Chapter three is 
going to analyze Celgene, Juno and the biopharmaceutical industry in which both companies operate. 
Chapter four will give valuation estimates for both company on a stand-alone basis prior to the 
transaction and as a merged firm after the acquisition. The main question of research will be whether 
and, if yes, how the merger is adding value to Celgene and whether the deals synergies justify the 
acquisition premium paid. The last chapter intends to sum up the thesis’ results and give a final 








2. Literature Review  
2.1 Valuation Techniques 
2.1.1 Absolute Valuation Techniques 
“An absolute valuation model is a model that specifies an asset’s intrinsic value. Such models are 
used to produce an estimate of value that can be compared with the asset’s market price” (Pinto et 
al., 2010). Two of the most important absolute valuation categories are the discounted cash flow 
models and the asset-based valuation model. Asset-based valuation models either obtain a disposal 
value (liquidation value) or replacement costs for a specific asset. They are mostly used for accounting 
purposes or in bankruptcy scenarios. Both models estimate an asset’s value based on some sort of 
cash flow forecast and/or the market value of comparable assets. Therefore, they cannot be strictly 
distinguished from the discounted cash flow and relative valuation models. Literature partly suggests 
in practice, they can be used as the lower bound to a firm valuation, since they tend to evaluate an 
entity’s assets independently without accounting for the potential value generation and growth that a 
company can accomplish by combining a variety of assets. Although, an asset-based valuation may 
yield the same values as other valuation techniques if the firm has no growth assets and the market 
assessments of value reflect expected cash flows (Damodaran, 2002).  
Damodaran refers to discounted cash flow (in the following: DCF) models as “the foundation on 
which all other valuation approaches are built” (2002). In fact, the first applications of DCF 
calculations seem to date back as far as 1800-1600 BC (cited in Shrieves and Wachowicz, 2001). 
DCF models are intrinsic valuation models which derive an asset’s value from its ability to generate 
future cash flows in relation to the time and risk involved. In a broad sense, all discounted cash flow 
valuation models rely on two main input factors:  
• (Projected) future cash flows  
• Discount rate  
There are various methods to conduct a DCF valuation. Explaining all of them would extent the 
content of this paper by far. As a consequence, no technical details are explained at this point. DCF 
valuation methods might differ in the type of cash flow used and in the applied discount rate, but they 
should all yield the same outcome (when applied correctly). According to Fernández, the differences 
between them result from calculating the present value of the tax shields (2007).  
Comparing different valuation techniques, Kaplan et. al. found “evidence that discounted cash flow 
valuation methods produce reliable estimates of market value” and that highly leveraged transactions 
were valued most accurately by using a compressed APV technique rather than other DCF techniques 
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(1996). Luehrman also argues, that APV is more reliable in situation where WACC discounting does 
not provide trust worthy results whilst providing more explanatory power to the management by 
dismantling financial side effects on firm value (1997). In fact, authors of corporate finance papers 
and text books seem to feel obligated to choose between the APV and the WACC side. Inselbag and 
Kaufold reveal, once again, that both techniques should lead to the same results, regardless of capital 
structure decisions. Although they add that the APV technique might be more convenient when firms 
aim to change their debt/ equity ratio, whereas WACC calculations are more practical when the capital 
structure is expected to remain relatively constant (1997). 
Any analysis, however, is only as accurate as the forecasts it relies on (Goedhart, Koller and Wessels, 
2005). The process of projecting future cash flows is therefore one of the major challenges in the 
equity valuation process. Cash flow projections in a DCF model can usually be divided into two 
categories. At first, explicit financial projections are made for a period of approximately five or ten 
years. These projections should be modeled by identifying key business drivers and their underlying 
factors. When the firm is expected to be in a steady state, the residual value of cash flows after the 
explicit period must be calculated. There are two main methods to do so: one of them is the Gordon 
Growth perpetuity model, which assumes that the cash flows will grow at a constant rate in perpetuity. 
The other one is the exit multiple approach, which basically simulates the company’s disposal at a 
multiple of one of their financial performance measures at the end of the explicitly forecasted period 
(Janiszewski, 2011). The discounted value of the explicitly projected future cash flows and the 
discounted residual value added up together are the result of the valuation.  
2.1.2 Relative Valuation Techniques 
“Relative valuation models estimate an asset’s value relative to that of another asset”. The underlying 
idea is, that similar assets should be traded at similar prices (Pinto et al., 2010). Relative valuation 
models are usually based on financial data from precedent transactions or comparable companies. 
They can either compute a firm’s equity or enterprise value. The process of computing firm or equity 
values on a multiple basis can be broken down into the following four steps (Brito, 2017):  
1) select a sample of comparable companies 
2) choose and compute a multiple for those peer companies/ precedent transactions 
3) aggregate those multiples into a single figure using a central statistics, such as the mean, the 
median, the harmonic mean or the geometric mean 
4) apply the aggregated multiple of peers/ transactions to the corresponding value of the firm/ 
equity under analysis in order to estimate its value 
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Step four is rather a mechanical part of the multiple calculation process. Controversial issues in 
multiple valuations mostly lie in the selection of peer companies/ precedent transactions, the selection 
of a central statistic measure and in the identification of the most appropriate multiple(s) for the target 
firm. Answers for all of these questions can be found in the relevant literature: 
Precedent transactions should be transactions that happened in recent times within the same industry. 
Mostly the number of transaction to choose from will be rather small, which turns their selection into 
a rather straight-forward process. The selection of peer companies turns out to be harder, since there 
is a larger range to choose from. Alford recommends to choose peers from the same industry defined 
by the three digit SIC code (1992). Later, Bhojraj and Lee tested statistical approaches to peer 
selection (e.g. cluster analysis, regression models) and found that results sharpen drastically, 
especially for the so called new economy stocks (2002). Regarding the number of comparable 
companies, Cooper and Cordeiro find, that “Using ten closely comparable firms is as accurate on 
average as using the entire cross-section of firms in an industry.”, that “it is generally better to use a 
small number rather than all firms in an industry with a large number of members” and that it is better 
to use a smaller industry sample with similar growth rates (Cooper et al., 2008).  
In line with Liu, Nissim and Thomas (2002), Brito found that the harmonic mean performs best out 
of all central statistics for all multiples and clustering procedures (Brito, 2017). Various papers have 
been searching for the most reliable multiple or the most reliable combination of multiples. Liu, 
Nissim and Thomas found, that “multiples based on forward earnings explain stock prices reasonably 
well (…). In terms of relative performance, our results show historical earnings measures are ranked 
second after forward earnings measures, cash flow measures and book value are tied for third, and 
sales performs the worst” (2002). Schreiner also finds, that equity value multiples outperform entity/ 
enterprise multiples. He also finds, that the two-year forward P/E ranks first and the one-year forward 
P/EBT ranks second for US companies (2007).  
Regarding the role of multiples in an equity valuation, most authors agree that they cannot replace a 
DCF model and are not as accurate as them, but that they are an enhancement to the DCF model. As 
an example, a study by Kaplan & Ruback finds, that the method of comparable company multiples 
reports the least accurate valuation results and that the comparable transactions approach worked 
much better. Nevertheless, they found that the most reliable estimates were found by using the DCF 
and the comparable methods combined (1996). 
11 
 
2.1.3 Contingent Claim Valuation Techniques 
“A contingent claim or option pays off only under certain contingencies - if the value of the 
underlying asset exceeds a pre-specified value for a call option or is less than a pre-specified value 
for a put option. Much work has been done in the last twenty years in developing models that value 
options, and these option pricing models can be used to value any assets that have option-like 
features”. An asset can be valued by modeling its payoff as a call option if the asset’s payoff depends 
on the asset exceeding a pre – specified level. It has put option - like features if its value increases as 
the value of the underlying asset drops below a specific level (Damodaran, 2002).  
Amongst other assets, this payoff character can be found in undeveloped natural reserves or licenses 
and patents. The most common option pricing schemes are the Black-Scholes Model and the Binomial 
Model. According to the Black-Scholes Model (Black and Scholes, 1973), an undeveloped field of 
natural reserves could be priced as:  = S0 N(d1) – Xe-rTN(d2) 
with 
=  ln � + ( + � )�√   
and =  −  �√   
 
Whereas  
C = Value of field 
S = Value of the commodity 
X = Exploration cost  
r = Risk free rate 
σ = Volatility of the commodity’s market price 
T = Exploration time1 
 
As time increases, the mine’s proven reserves and therefore the mine’s value decreases. This can be 
modeled by using the Black approximation for dividend yields or by using separate annual options. 
An application of the binomial Model can be found in Kellog, Charnes and Demirer (2000). They 
calculate the expected net present value of a drug development project as:  




i (1,…,7) = seven stages from discovery through post drug approval2 ρ  = probability that stage i is the end stage for the drug 
                                                 
1 e.g. maturity of the mining license  








T = time at which all future cash flows become zero 
DCFit = expected development stage cash flow at time t given that stage 
i is the end stage �d = discount rate for development cash flows 
j (1,…,5) = index of quality for the drug �  = probability that the drug is of quality j 
CCFjt= expected commercialization cash flow at time t for a drug of 
quality j 
rc = is the discount rate for commercialization cash flows 
 
A graphical representation of this process can be found in the Appendix 1. The intuition behind this 
calculation is that there is a probability of failure for all seven stages of the drug approval process. 
For a failure, the expectation value will be zero. The expected net present value of the development 
project therefore depends (amongst others) on the likelihood of approval throughout all given stages 
and the expected cash flows for each stag. Kellog, Charnes and Demirer extent this basic model to 
incorporate growth options in later stages.  
2.2 Mergers & Acquisitions 
2.2.1 Classification  
Mergers and Acquisitions (from now on M&A) are financial transactions. Reed, Lajoux and Nesvold 
distinguish between them by defining a merger as a process in which “one corporation is combined 
with and disappears into another corporation” whereas they describe an acquisition as the change of 
ownership of assets or stock (2007). Other authors draw the line between these two transaction types 
by defining a merger as a transaction between similar sized companies, whereas an acquisition 
scenario is defined by having a considerably larger buyer than seller (DeChesare, 2016).  
Damodaran proposes a classification that distinguishes between acquisitions lead by the company’s 
own management (Buyouts) and acquisitions lead by other firms. A short summary of his M&A 
categorization can be found in Appendix 2.  
2.2.2 Deal structure 
Once the decision for an acquisition has been made, the deal needs to be structured. The deal 
structuring process involves the search for an acquisition vehicle, the form of payment, the form of 
acquisition, accounting- and tax considerations. Goals of the deal structuring process lie in the 
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minimization of tax payments and risk, whilst not giving away too much earning potential and 
fulfilling all legal requirements (DePamphilis, 2014).  
The forms of payment include stock, cash, debt, assets or a mix of those (DePamphilis, 2014). 
Acquirers may use cash if the firm has significant borrowing capacity, substantial excess cash 
reserves, and undervalued shares and wishes to maintain control. This cash can either come from own 
cash reserves or from debt, to add leverage to the structure. The acquirer may choose to use stock if 
it is believed to be overvalued and has limited borrowing capacity and excess cash balances. Acquirer 
shares might be especially attractive to the seller if their growth prospects are strong. Furthermore, 
they can be used to split risk between the partners. Other forms of noncash payment include real 
property, rights to intellectual property, royalties, earnouts, and contingent payments. 
A study of payment choices in European Mergers & Acquisitons between 1997 and 2000 has found 
that the choice of payment foremost depends on the tradeoff between corporate governance concerns 
and debt financing constraints. They also found that incentives to choose cash are strong, when a 
bidder’s controlling shareholder has an intermediate level of voting power and when the voting 
control of their dominant share- holders is threatened. When the owner of the bidder and target is the 
same, indicating that when the target is under bidder control, they see that stock financing of the 
M&A deal is more likely. They also observe that stock financing is less likely for unlisted targets and 
corporate subsidiaries, which supports bidder aversion to creating a new block holder.  
2.2.3 Reasons and Drivers  
There are various reasons to engage in M&A activities. In financial terms, buyside M&A activity 
should increase earnings per share for the buyer’s shareholders. A transaction that increases earnings 
per share for the buyer is called an accretive transaction. A transaction that does not increase earnings 
per share for the buyer’s shareholders is called a dilutive transaction.  
In practice, M&A activity can be driven by various factors. Some of them are (Roberts, Wallace and 
Moles, 2016), (DePamphilis, 2014):  
• Strategic rationale: M&A to reach strategic objectives (e.g. market entry) 
• Cross selling potential: increase revenues by offering related products to existing customers  
• Cost savings: improve merged firm’s cost structure 
• Diversification: buying firms beyond a company’s current lines of business to achieve higher 
growth rates and a reduction in cost of capital  
• National and international business consolidation: two companies combine assets to 
improve their position in the market  
• Integration: horizontal or vertical 
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• Resource acquisition: M&A to gain access to specific assets and skills  
• Tax considerations: target’s losses may be used to offset future profits of the merged firm  
Some M&A drivers have brought more, others less success to the company’s shareholders. In many 
cases, the drivers of M&A activity have been used to identify potential synergies and to therefore 
justify the engagement in M&A activities.  
2.2.4 Synergies  
“Synergy is the additional value that is generated by combining two firms, creating opportunities that 
would not been available to these firms operating independently” (Damodaran, 2015). Damodaran 
further distinguishes synergies in operating and financial synergies.  
Operating synergies are synergies that lead to an increase in operating income. They do so by 
increasing income from existing assets and/or increase growth. The four types of operating synergies, 
according to Damodaran, are: economies of scale, greater pricing power, combination of different 
functional strengths and higher growth in new or existing markets. These synergies affect margins, 
returns and return growth. In terms of valuation, they are usually expressed in higher cash flows 
(Damodaran, 2015). Dividing the potential for operating synergies into increased cash inflows and 
reduced cash outflows, the latter one is often perceived as more realistic. Studying the 50 largest US 
mergers between 1979 and 1983, Healy, Palepu and Rubak indeed find improvements in sample 
firm’s cash flows returns mainly as a result of increased asset productivity but also as a result of 
reduced labor costs (Healy et al., 1990).  
Financial Synergies do not affect the operating income. Examples for financial Synergies are Tax 
Benefits, an increase in debt capacity, the avoidance of underfunding and risk diversification. In terms 
of valuation, they usually lead to a decrease in capital costs (Damodaran, 2015). Leland examined the 
existence of purely financial synergies and their effect on firm value through the separation and 
isolation of non-synergetic operations. He found that “In many cases, examples calibrated to 
empirical data suggest that financial synergies are insufficient to justify mergers by themselves, but 
they can become important in specialized circumstances” (2005). The Synergy valuation process is 
done after the value of the combined firm without synergies was computed.  
2.2.5 Value Creation  
There is a vivid discussion on whether M&A creates value, and if yes, for whom. Bruner criticizes 
that “the conventional wisdom is poorly grounded in the scientific evidence on the subject. The 
fashionable view seems to be that M&A is a loser’s game” (2005). In fact, Eccles et. al. claim that 
M&A pays poorly for the buyer and cites studies measuring M&A performance in the 70s and in the 
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90s. He also illustrates that a fair acquisition value differs between potential acquirers for the same 
target. The buyer has to make sure that there are enough synergies to justify the premium paid above 
the intrinsic value (1999). Devos et. al. analyzed 264 large mergers and found, that the average gains 
in firm value through synergies lies at about 10% of the combined company’s firm value (2009).  
The drivers for a successful, value creating merger are specific to each transaction. Although an 
evaluation of literature and data on the topic of M&A value creation by Bruner has brought forward 
18 conditions under which M&A tends to perform well and 18 characteristics under which it tends to 




3. Company and Industry Profile  
3.1 Industry and Market Dynamics  
3.1.1 Industry Introduction 
Celgene describes itself as a global biopharmaceutical company (Celgene Corporation, 2018h). In the 
past two decades, this industry has created almost $1.7 trillion in shareholder value over the S&P 500 
($1 trillion from pharma and $0.7 trillion from biotech) (Backer and Ruby, 2017). Being described 
as large, diversified and global, they are sometimes referred to as some of the most critical and 
competitive sectors in the economy (International Trade Administration, 2016). Biotechnological/ 
pharmaceutical products tend to have long development lead times, high risk of failure and usually 
undergo exhaustive regulation. On the other hand, drug producers can hold tremendous pricing 
power, offering lifesaving innovation in highly profitable markets. Companies in these industries 
need to plan far ahead to avoid revenue holes. Their valuations fluctuate with their research prospects 
and the commercialization of their intellectual property. On top of that, the industries constantly find 
themselves morally challenged between ethical issues and commercial obligations. The industries’ 
products can be categorized by the following three criteria:  
1.) Accessibility: over the counter drugs vs. prescribed drugs  
2.) Intellectual protection: generic drugs vs. innovative drugs  
3.) Production: chemically derived vs. biologically derived 
Celgene is a producer of prescribed drugs. Their products cannot be accessed without a physician’s 
written consent (prescription). They are focused on the development and production of innovative 
drugs. This term refers to drugs that can claim an intellectual protection status (patent and/ or 
exclusivity), which forbids competitors to copy the product or the underlying intellectual property for 
many years. Other criteria to categorize drugs can be the production process. Pharmaceutical goods 
can be derived from chemicals or from biological processes. This line marks the main difference 
between pharmaceutical and biotechnological goods/ companies. Also, the production scope for the 
biotechnology sector is much broader than for the pharmaceutical sector. Aside drug production and 
development, companies in the biotechnological industry might produce goods for the agricultural 
sector, research sources for alternative fuels or produce ecologically sustainable plastics instead of 
drugs.  
Pharmaceutical companies can be large multinational drug producers with various research projects 
over a large spectrum of diseases, or small companies that specialize on a narrow field of medical 
conditions. Biotechnology companies are mostly small, research driven companies which tend to be 
unprofitable for many years. They hardly ever issue dividends, so investors usually supply liquidity 
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with prospects to capitalize on the disposal of intellectual property (e.g. royalties) or through an 
external acquisition some time in the future. 
For Celgene, the acquisition of Juno can be interpreted as a strategic decision to diversify their product 
pipeline over the mid- and long-term future by internalizing cutting edge research that they have 
financed and supported for many years. This soon-to-be company is going to sell its products in a 
highly competitive market. The following paragraphs are going to give an overview over the biotech/ 
pharma industry. It is going to evaluate Celgene’s products and relevant markets, their dynamics and 
the competitive environment that they have to operate in.  
3.1.2 The U.S. Drug Approval Process 
Celgene’s goods need to be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (In the following: FDA) 
to be commercialized in the US American pharmaceutical market. Over the last 150 years, the FDA 
has evolved from a small division of the U.S. Patent Office to one of the largest consumer protection 
agencies in the world. Its mission is to ensure that new medical treatments reach the public as quickly 
as possible, while simultaneously ensuring that they are both safe and effective (Van Norman, 2016a 
and Van Norman, 2016b). If a drug is not considered safe and/or does not provide benefits over 
existing treatments, the FDA will not give their approval and the drug must not be sold in the USA. 
Figure I 
The FDA Drug Approval Process 
(Source: Lolic, 2017) 
 
The Drug approval and review process starts when a company has developed a new drug compound. 
In a pre-clinical testing stage, the drug is tested for toxicity on animals. If it passes the toxicity tests, 
the drug is entering the three phases of clinical testing. Phase I is focused on safety, phase II is focused 
on effectiveness and phase III investigates both criteria in experiments with different dosages and 
populations. The number of participants increases from a few dozen to thousands of people in phase 
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III trials. If the NDA review has been successful, the product may be sold to the public. At this point, 
the phase IV (post-clinical review) begins. During that stage, the drug manufacturer needs to submit 
periodic safety updates to the FDA (U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA), 2018b). The process 
might vary under special circumstances (e.g. Orphan Act for very rare diseases or fast track approval 
process). The whole process of bringing a drug from the laboratory to the market takes an average 
time of 12 years (Van Norman, 2016b) and can cost billions of dollars. Once approved, a patent or 
market exclusivity is granted. Patents and exclusivity work in a similar fashion but are distinct from 
one another and governed by different statutes. For example, patents are property rights that normally 
last for 20 years, whilst exclusivity refers to certain delays and prohibitions on approval of competitor 
drugs, which can last for up to seven years (U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA), 2018a). Both 
statuses help to protect products from being copied and therefore tends to reward innovative products 
with high market shares and additional pricing power. 
The FDA approval process is interpreted as one of the world’s most supportive domestic 
environments for the development and commercialization of pharmaceuticals with minimal market 
barriers (International Trade Administration, 2016). Regulatory hurdles in international markets are 
going to differ from US law and might require additional efforts.  
3.1.3 Products and Markets  
 Celgene produces a variety of medical goods that can be applied to a variety of different diseases. 
Each product needs to receive a separate FDA approval for every potential medical condition that it 
could be prescribed for. Celgene’s products are used to cure the following diseases:  
• Hematology/ blood disorders: Multiple Myeloma, Myelodysplastic Syndromes, Acute 
Myeloid Leukemia, Lymphoma, Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia, Mantle Cell Lymphoma, 
Beta Thalassemia  
• Oncology: Myelofibrosis, Solid Tumors 
• Inflammations and Immunological diseases 
Often, Celgene products are first approved for a certain disease and are later redeveloped for further 
therapeutic applications. REVLIMID®, for example, was approved for the treatment of 
Myelodysplastic Syndromes in 2005, for relapsed/ refractory Multiple Myeloma in 2006 and for 
newly diagnosed transplant ineligible Multiple Myeloma in 2016. These sicknesses can be 
summarized under the category “Hematology” (blood cancer). In the US, a new person is diagnosed 
with blood cancer every three minutes (approximately 170,000 new incidents per year). Every nine 
minutes, a patient dies from blood cancer (Leukemia and Lymphomia Society (LLS), 2017). 
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The overall oncology market is expected to grow at a CAGR of 7.1% and reach a value of about 
$112bn in 2020 (Tatkare, 2015). With REVLIMID® contributing for more than half of Celgene’s 
revenue, the market for hematologic cancer therapies is clearly the most important one for Celgene, 
at this time.  
Celgene is currently developing a variety of innovative drugs. Two examples are the bb2121/ 
bb21217 and JCAR017. Both drug candidates are based on the CAR-T technology. Bb2121 is a phase 
I drug candidate addressed to treat patients suffering from Multiple Myeloma. In march 2018, 
Celgene has engaged into a strategic long-term agreement to co-develop, manufacture and 
commercialize the product with bluebird bio (Celgene Corporation, 2018a) after receiving 
breakthrough therapy designation by the FDA. This status is given when preliminary clinical evidence 
demonstrates substantial improvement over available therapy in at least one clinically significant 
criteria (Celgene Corporation, 2017b). JCAR017 has received this status in 2017 (Celgene 
Corporation, 2018f). It is a drug candidate in phase I-II trials aimed to cure Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma, 
but the company believes, that the underlying technology can be applied to a broader variety of 
medical conditions (2018). The JCAR research & development series started as a strategic project 
with Juno, which Celgene has fully acquired in March 2018. According to analyst estimates, the 
product is expected to provide first revenues as early as 2019.  
An overview over Celgene’s products, their pipeline and therapeutic applications is given in 
Appendix 4. JP Morgan has valued Celgene’s pipeline at a stand-alone value of about $20bn in March 
2018 (Kasimov, 2018).  
3.1.4 Retail and Consumption Process  
Celgene develops a variety of pharmaceutical products to treat cancer and inflammatory diseases. 
With a revenue contribution of about 75% in 2017, Celgene’s most important market is the US 
market. On this market, the company primarily sells their drugs to wholesale distributors (1). 
Wholesale distributors sell their drugs to pharmacies or specialized pharmaceutical retail stores (2) 
(f.e. CVS Health Corporation, 2018). These drugs can be picked up by the patient in these pharmacies 
or specialized stores (4) if they have been previously prescribed to him by a physician as part of a 






The pharma industry is known for their efforts to influence physician’s prescription preferences 
through their marketing efforts. These can be gifts, free drug samples or invitations to prestigious 
events. A study conducted in the District of Columbia suggests that gifts from pharmaceutical 
companies are associated with more prescriptions per patient, more costly prescriptions, and a higher 
proportion of branded prescriptions. Gifts of any size had an effect and larger gifts elicited a larger 
impact on prescribing behaviors. Their study proves that pharmaceutical companies have the 
capability and potential to increase sales volume through such marketing channels and that drug 
prescription in the US is not solely conducted on medical rationale. On a macroeconomic level, the 
authors argue, that “Industry gifts influence prescribing behavior, may have adverse public health 
implications, and should be banned” (Wood et al., 2017).  
The retail and prescription process for prescribed drugs differs in markets outside the USA. Celgene’s 
customers in other countries are mostly clinics, hospitals and retail chains, many of which are 
government owned. The retail and prescription process might therefore vary, but should be similar 
by nature.  
3.1.5 Prescription Drug Pricing in the United States of America  
The pricing process for prescriptive drugs differs from most other markets. In many countries, state 
authorities are the only major customer for medical goods. In this case, both parties must agree on 
prices for pharmaceutical products from a position of similar bargaining leeway, because there might 
be only one seller and one customer which both have strong incentives to agree on common terms.  
In the US, the process is different because the government can legally not negotiate prices directly 
with drug producers. Instead, drug producers set prices independently and give discounts to major 
customers like private insurers or wholesale distributors. Drug providers tend to find themselves in a 
position of strong negotiation power because there might not be sufficient substitutes due to strong 
intellectual protection rights.  
There are situations in which pharmaceutical companies have monopolist-like pricing power. This is 
the case, if the current practice of medicine is changed by his product through a “first-in-class” or 
“best-in-class” discovery. A first-in-class drug is a highly innovative drug that uses a new unique 
mechanism of action for treating a medical condition. These drugs can possibly be the first and only 
solution to treat certain diseases. A best-in-class drug is a drug that succeeds over all other competitor 
products in all or most relevant medication criteria. That can be a drug that is more efficient and, at 
the same time, safer to use than all competitor products. After some time, these products usually have 
to compete with generic products because their exclusivity rights have expired. If the market is very 
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small, however, competition might not view the market as attractive enough and does not choose to 
compete against the first-/ or best-in-class product (f.e. many orphan drug markets). In this case, 
manufacturers of pharmaceutical goods can possibly increase prices heavily without facing declines 
in sales volume.  
Figure III  
US Prescription Drug Expenditures 
Figure III shows the annual expenditures for prescription drugs in the USA from 2008 to 2018. (Source: Statista, 2018a).  
 
All in all, prescription drug expenditures in the USA have risen by 4.8% on average over the last 10 
years. Although, drug prices have been growing above inflation, the increase in total expenditures for 
prescribed drugs can not only be attributed to the pharmaceutical industry’s pricing power. Other 
factors are, for example, changes in the population’s general health conditions and changes in 
healthcare consumption patterns.  
3.1.6 Competition & Rivalry  
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, in which Celgene operates, are highly competitive 
and subject to rapid and significant technological change (Celgene Corporation, 2018f). Their current 
products and product candidates face competition from other innovative drugs and, in some cases, 
generic drugs. Among other factors, Celgene names product efficacy, safety, reliability, availability, 
price, third-party reimbursement, sales and promotional activities as factors that determine the degree 
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On the other hand, they face competition from small, specialized biopharmaceutical research 
companies like UCB. Their competition includes cell-based and non-cell-based treatments.  
Celgene has had the highest revenue growth and the highest R&D expenditures relative to sales in 
comparison to its competitors. On the one hand, this can be interpreted as a focus on growth through 
internally developed products, on the other hand it could also be interpreted as a lack of efficiency. 
Competitors might also pursue different strategies in the development of their products (f.e. M&A or 
options on external R&D projects that have not been accounted for in their R&D expenditure section). 
Celgene’s growth in sales must also be viewed highly positive but was largely driven by 
REVLIMID® revenue growth and is therefore dependent on the performance of one single product 
which is expected to reach peak sales in 2021. 
According to Celgene’s annual report 2017, all companies in Figure IV compete with Celgene in one 
or multiple markets. Even though, the competitor’s overall product portfolio may vary a lot from 
Celgene’s product portfolio. For example, a competitor might offer drugs to treat Lymphoma, Lung 
Cancer and HIV, but may not sell drugs to treat Myeloma. In the same manner, the prescription 
spectrum might differ between drugs that compete for the application in one specific medical 
condition, exposing them to a variety of competition in a variety of highly specialized sub markets.  
Figure V 
Cancer Drugs 
Figure V ranks the top 10 cancer drugs across all cancer types by revenue for the year 2016 worldwide. The drug manufacturer is given 
in brackets behind the drug title. (Source: Statista, 2018b) 
 













With regard to revenue figures for cancer drugs, Roche has been selling the three most successful 
products in 2016. Global revenue for RITUXAN® has been at about $7.5bn. The drug is a direct 
competitor for REVLIMID® used for the treatment for common forms of blood cancer but it is also 
used for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis and certain types of vasculitis (Statista, 2018b) and is 
therefore prescribed across a greater variety of medical conditions.  
The industry’s degree of rivalry can be analyzed using Porter’s five forces analyses. Despite low 
threat of entrants, power of suppliers and power of buyers, the competitive rivalry in the industry is 
very high. Details on the industry’s five forces analysis can be found in Appendix 5.  
The biopharmaceutical industry attracts investors due to the promise of high profit margins for 
successfully commercialized research projects. As a consequence, CAR-T research has accelerated 
since Novartis’ Tisagenlecleucel has been approved as a first-in-class drug for B-cell Leukemia in 
the fall of 2017 (U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA), 2017). Research is conducted by various 
companies in several regions of the world. Sometimes, even key industry players lack information on 
competition. According to a Financial Times article from April 2018, significant research milestones 
have been overcome by Chinese drug researcher Nanjing Legend. Their CAR-T trial reports at the 
annual meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology have left competitors astonished, with 
a reported patient response rate of 94%, superior to all trials conducted by US companies (Crow, 
Hancock and Xueqiao, 2018). Shortly after, Johnson & Johnson has agreed to engage into a $350mn 
agreement to partner up with them. Moreover, the merger market for CAR-T research has been hot 
in recent months. One of the most notable deals, asides the Juno acquisition, has been the acquisition 
of Kite Pharma by Gilead Sciences for $11.9bn in August 2017 (Gilead Sciences Inc., 2017b). Many 
companies have put significant time and capital into the development of a best-in-class CAR-T 
therapy system. The situation seems to develop more and more into a winner-takes-it-all scenario and 
the competition is becoming more fierce and incomprehensible over time.  
3.2 Company Profile: Celgene Corporation 
Celgene is an integrated, global biopharmaceuticals company. Together with its subsidiaries, it is 
engaged in the discovery, development and commercialization of therapies for the treatment of cancer 
and inflammatory diseases. Celgene was originally founded in 1980 as a Celanese business unit, 
incorporated in in the State of Delaware (USA) in 1986 and spun off as an independent, public 
company in 1987 (Celgene Corporation, 2018c).  
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The company has about 7500 full-time employees and mainly operates in the United States. Likewise, 
more than 75% of their revenues came from the US market (Celgene Corporation, 2018f). General 
Celgene company information is summarized in Appendix 6. 
Celgene’s products are developed through research in protein homeostasis, immuno-oncology, 
epigenetics, immunology and neuro-inflammation procedures. This drug development process is 
complex, consisting of many interrelated business activities and functional constituents. On a 
regulatory level, all their products must go through the FDA drug approval process to be 
commercialized in the US. Some of their products had to go through the process several times to be 
used for multiple therapy purposes. Celgene’s products are then governed by patent/ market 
exclusivity status.  
However, drugs tend to become medically outdated/ copied by generics which leads towards revenue 
degeneration as time progresses after their FDA approval.  
Figure VI 
Celgene Product Portfolio 
Figure VI plots Celgene’s product portfolio by the product’s relative revenue contribution for the fiscal year 2017 on the x axis and the 
annual CAGR (2015 – 2017) on the Y axis. Products that have been first approved by the FDA after 2012 are marked blue, older 
products have been marked black. (Source: (Celgene Corporation, 2018f) 
 




































 REVLIMID® is mainly used to treat multiple myeloma (blood cancer) and 
myelodysplastic syndromes (bone marrow diseases). In 2017, it accounted for 
more than 60% of Celgene’s revenue. In their annual report, they note that “A 
significant decline in REVLIMID®’s net revenue, in the absence of offsetting 
increases in revenue from our other marketed products, would have a material 
adverse effect on our results of operations, cash flows and financial condition” 
(2018f). REVLIMID®’s revenues have been growing at about 20% on average 
in the last years and its last patent is expected to expire only in 2027 (USA) 
according to company information (2018f) but the product is expected to face 
first generic competition after 2021. Being first approved by the FDA in 2006, 
the product has been approved for various other therapies in the following 10 
years. REVLIMID® is expected to remain Celgene’s most important product 






 POMALYST®/IMNOVID®, OTEZLA® and IDHIFA® have been approved 
by the FDA no later than 2013, with IDHIFA® being approved by the FDA in 
the 3rd quarter of 2017. Together, they accounted for about 22% of Celgene’s 
revenue in 2017. From all currently marketed Celgene products, this group can 








 ABRAXANE®, VIDAZA®, azacitidine for injection, THALOMID® and 
ISTODAX® have been approved before 2013. Together they make up for about 
14% of Celgene’s revenue. Their CAGR has been slightly positive or negative. 
Patents and exclusivity are running out/ have been running out. Some of these 
products might become technically obsolete and/ or going to be copied by 
generics in the next years. Their contribution to Celgene’s revenue streams is 






Companies in the biotech/ pharma industry put significant efforts in their R&D pipeline to prevent 
future revenue gaps. The outcome of these projects has a strong impact on Celgene’s value. Amongst 
others, Celgene is currently engaged in various research and drug development projects in the areas 
of Immune-Inflammatory diseases, Myeloid Diseases, Epigenetics Protein Homeostasis and 
Immuno-Oncology. JP Morgan estimates that about one third of the company’s firm value will result 
from Celgene’s current R&D pipeline (2018). An overview of Celgene’s product pipeline and its 
progression level is given in Appendix 4. 
Pharmaceutical drugs and therapies are highly heterogeneous goods. Their prescription depends 
(amongst other factors) on the patient’s characteristics and the progression level of the specific 
illness4. The level of competition might therefore differ between specific products and even within 




There have been solid double digit average growth rates for revenue, gross profit, EBIT and net 
income over the last three years. In absolute numbers, Celgene’s revenue growth was the highest 
across the whole industry, according to Bloomberg (Goonewardene and Rye, 2018). Most of 
Celgene’s costs lie in the operating expenses section (R&D expenses). Cost of goods sold are almost 
neglectable, enabling them to have a 96% gross profit margin in 2017. A significant amount of the 
cash inflow from operations has been used for investing activities (about $3bn) and share repurchases 
(about $4bn).  
Despite that, Celgene’s liquidity situation is still superb with more than $12bn held in cash, cash 
equivalents or marketable securities (about 40% of total assets). Their debt to total capital ratio lies 
slightly above 50%. Shareholder’s equity on the other hand makes up about 23% of total capital.  
 
                                                 
4 Please see 3.1.4 for more information on the drug prescription process. 
(in mn) FY15 FY16 FY17 CAGR
Revenue  $               9,256  $             11,229  $             13,003 19%
Gross Profit  $               8,836  $             10,791  $             12,542 19%
EBIT  $               2,255  $               3,166  $               4,707 44%




2020 sales guidance from $21bn to $19bn. One reason for this was that clinical trials for Mongersen 
had to be terminated (Kim, 2018). Since then, investors have been concerned whether Celgene’s 
pipeline is sufficient to fuel long term growth for the company. The downward trend has continued 
and their shares have been falling 29% from 10th April 2017 until 10th April 2018 at an annualized 
volatility of about 30%. The acquisition of Juno was announced on the 22nd January 2018. On that 
day, Celgene’s share price increased by 0.25%.  
The company recently made significant investments in the development of CAR-T based cell 
immunotherapy systems by acquiring Juno and engaging into a co-development agreement with 
bluebird bio (Celgene Corporation, 2018a). The purpose of this strategy is to accelerate revenue 
diversification with meaningful growth drivers from 2020 and beyond (Celgene Corporation, 2018d) 
to be less reliant on revenues derived from their bestseller and to compensate for revenue holes caused 
by degenerating products in the middle- and long-term future. Celgene’s CEO Mark Alles comments 
the transaction as follows: “Our colleagues at Juno are developing some of the most promising 
approaches to treating cancer, and we are excited to add their pioneering work to Celgene's leading 
hematology and oncology research and commercial platform. Together, we expect to expand our 





3.3 Company Profile: Juno Therapeutics  
Juno is a biopharmaceutical company, which is focused on the development of cellular 
immunotherapies for the treatment of cancer (mainly CAR and TCR technology). The company was 
founded in 2013 through a collaboration of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Memorial 
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and pediatrics partner Seattle Children's Research Institute after one 
of their lymphoma patients first experienced significant responses from a CAR-T treatment in 2010 
(Kochenderfer et al., 2010). Since then, they have received funding from various research 
organizations and private sources until going public in 20145.  
In June 2015, they entered into a ten-year master research and collaboration agreement with Celgene, 
pursuant to which Juno and Celgene are to research, develop and commercialize novel cellular 
therapy product candidates and other immuno-oncology and immunology therapeutics, including, in 
particular, CAR and TCR product candidates (Juno Therapeutics Inc., 2015). Both partners had 
initially agreed to conduct independent products, whereas each party had certain options to obtain 
either an exclusive license to develop and commercialize specified product candidates or the right to 
participate in the co-development and co-commercialization of them (Juno Therapeutics Inc., 2018). 
On January 2018, they entered into a merger agreement with Celgene pursuant to which Juno will 
survive as a wholly-owned subsidiary in the Celgene group.  
As such, Juno is expected to continue research on T cells with the goal to develop best-in-class CAR 
and TCR cancer therapy systems. While both systems differ in certain biotechnological aspects, the 
therapy process for them can be summarized in five steps:  
1.) Patient’s white blood cells are artificially harvested (Leukaphersis) 
2.) Ex vivo (out of body) selection & activation of patient’s T cells 
3.) CAR/ TCR gene sequences are transferred into the T cell to help it detect and destroy cancer 
proteins 
4.) Patient’s T cells are expanded until they reach the desired dose 
5.) Reinfusion of T cells into the patient’s body6 
Juno’s current research is mainly focused on optimizing certain cell characteristics, the T cell protein 
composition and the composition of chemotherapeutic agents used after Leukaphersis to increase the 
tumor’s vulnerability to the reinjected T cells. They believe, that their further research may provide 
greater consistency across patients and give them a competitive advantage over competitor’s products 
to have their products reach a best-in-class status. The most advanced research amongst both systems 
is currently targeted towards certain types of Lymphoma, but Juno believes that it is possible to 
                                                 
5 General information about Juno is summarized in Appendix 7.  
6 A graphic overview is given in Appendix 8. 
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develop immunotherapies targeting a broad array of cancer-associated proteins, including solid organ 
cancers (Juno Therapeutics Inc., 2018).  
Figure VIII 
Juno Revenue Contribution 
Figure VIII shows Juno’s revenue contribution by contract partners in the fiscal years 2016 and 2017. (Source:(Juno Therapeutics 
Inc., 2018)) 
 
Juno generated $112mn of revenue in 2017, primarily through research collaborations and licensing 
agreements. These contracts allow Juno’s Partners to commercialize products based on their 
intellectual property or to participate in Juno’s research operations and can be dependent on the on-
time accomplishment of certain mile stones or the contractor’s product sales. In their annual report, 
they acknowledge that most of their revenues have primarily been generated from their collaboration 
with Celgene. Another significant partner is Novartis, from which Juno receives upfront, milestone 
and royalty revenues as part of a sublicense agreement from previous research projects (2018).  
Table IV 

















(in mn) FY15 FY16 FY17
CFO  $         7  $    -190  $           -225 
CFF  $     851  $       37  $             338 
CFI  $    -962  $       89  $             -68 





Juno Summary Statistics 
Table V shows summary statistics for Juno share returns in comparison to the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index from 15th March 2017 
until 15th March 2018. (Source: Yahoo Finance) 
 
From spring 2017 until 2018 their share price has almost quadrupled due to more favorable results in 
their research pipeline and the initiating acquisition by Celgene. Juno’s acquisition by Celgene was 
officially announced by Celgene on the 22nd January 2018 (2018g). Juno shares increased by 52% in 
price on the 17th January and by another 27% on the 22nd, pushing Juno’s shares close to the tender 
offer price of $87. All in all, the deal was conducted at a 29% premium (Celgene Corporation, 2018b), 
valuing the company at about $9.9bn (Messer, 2018) before delisting Juno from the NASDAQ in the 
middle of March 2018.  
Most recently, Juno’s co-founder and former CEO Hans Bishop was elected to Celgene’s Board of 
Directors (Celgene Corporation, 2018e). Celgene CEO Mark Alles referred to this step as following: 
"The changes announced today strengthen corporate governance by refreshing our Board of Directors 
and improving strategic insights provided to management in areas critical to our future success. Hans 
is a pioneer in the field of cellular immunotherapy whose expertise will help Celgene lead in this 












Percentile 2.5% -8.00% -2.29%





4.1.1 Relative Valuation 
The diverse nature of business models, the relative newness of the companies, the lack of many 
tangible assets and the limited financial history available are difficulties to overcome when valuing a 
biotechnology company. The high degree of uncertainty, the long development times required to 
produce marketable assets and the development of competitor’s research are further hurdles when 
forecasting revenues for the industry. As a consequence, Keegan concludes, that there is no obvious 
or accepted way of applying valuation in this field (2008).  
The market for CAR-T companies has been hot in recent quarters. There have been various partnering 
agreements, IPOs and early financing rounds for investors to participate in the race to commercialize 
novel cancer therapies. The two most similar transactions to Celgene’s acquisition of Juno in terms 
of geographical, industry specific and financial characteristics are the acquisitions of Kite Pharma by 
Gilead Sciences and the acquisition of Bioverativ Inc. by Sanofi SA. Just like Juno, Kite is engaged 
in CAR-T research with therapies for relapsed or refractory aggressive non-Hodgkin lymphoma 
currently under review by the FDA. According to company information, the acquisition has been 
completed in October 2017 through a 29% premium tender offer, valuing Kite Pharma’s equity at 
$11.9bn (Gilead Sciences Inc., 2017a). Bioverativ is a US company mainly engaged into the research 
for hemophilia and related blood order diseases by non-gene-based therapy methods. The acquisition 
company has been acquired in March 2018 with a 64% premium at an equity price of $11.6bn (Sanofi 
Corporation, 2018).  
Table VI 
Juno Precedent Transactions 
Table VI estimates implied equity prices for Juno based on precedent transaction multiples. Peer comparison based on Juno 
transaction values. (Sources: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters) 
 
Since Juno did not generate profits, equity value multiples based on (f.e.) profit, EBIT or EBITDA 
cannot be applied. Instead, more cash flow unrelated multiples had to be used. The multiples 
EV/ Revenue 114x 114x $12.53bn $12.58bn 27% 27%
EV/ R&D Exp. 18x 16x $7.86bn $7.10bn -21% -28%
EV/ Book Value 5x 5x $7.57bn $7.37bn -23% -26%


















calculation is based on FY2017 data. Juno was acquired on a discount between 39% and 113% 
compared to the average of the two most similar industry transactions in the recent past, based on the 
given multiples. Although, it must be mentioned, that the multiples used are  
Table VII 
Juno Peer Group 
Table VII estimates implied equity valuations for Juno based on peer group multiples (FY2017 data). Peer comparison based on 
Juno’s transaction value. (Sources: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters) 
 
Juno mentions a diverse variety of almost 40 competitors in their annual report 2017 (2018). A lot of 
them are privately held companies. Analyzing the remaining companies for cluster, Bluebird Bio Inc., 
Incyte Corp. and Ziopharm Oncology Inc. are identified as Juno’s nearest neighbors. Cluster Analysis 
results can be found in Appendix 9. Applying their average and median multiples to Juno gives an 
equity valuation range between $7.37bn and $13.24bn, diverging about 30% in both directions 
compared to the actual transaction value. Again, it must be mentioned that the accuracy of these 
valuation results need to be analyzed with caution because the applied multiples are not closely related 
to cash flow. Forward multiples have not been applied because Juno and (many of) its peers are not 
expected to generate profits/ positive cash flows in the next years.  
4.1.2 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation  
A common proverb in Finance, claims that cash is king. This is one of the reasons why a profound 
DCF analysis should be at the heart of every equity valuation. The basic idea is that an asset is worth 
the cash it generates in the future discounted by time and risk. However, Keegan argues, that cash is 
irrelevant in valuing ongoing biotechnology businesses because the likelihood of management giving 
it back to the investors is very remote due to the immense cash burn required to build the company 
(2008).  
Value can rather be derived from the commercial potential of the company’s R&D pipeline relative 
to their success probabilities. Other potential value drivers like interest tax shields, working capital/ 
EV/ Revenue 114x 114x $12.53bn $12.58bn 27% 27%
EV/ R&D Exp. 18x 16x $7.86bn $7.10bn -21% -28%
EV/ Book Value 5x 5x $7.57bn $7.37bn -23% -26%




















cost efficiency etc. can practically be neglected due to the company’s business model and financing 
structure.  
Keegan therefore introduces a DCF related, probability weighted net present value approach for all 
pipeline assets advancing Phase I trials without explicitly taking into account the cash required to 
develop it. Originally, he does not consider any drug candidates in Phase I or below because their 
profile is not considered sufficiently recognizable, yet. Though, the majority of Juno’s assets are early 
stage projects. The valuation would lack the majority of its base without considering them. Therefore, 
Phase I projects have been considered in Juno’s valuation. Preclinical candidates have not been 
considered in the valuation. The company’s equity value is computed by multiplying the estimated 
sum of profit by a pharma specific P/E factor, implying the company is maturing towards a traditional 
pharmaceutical company.  
The model’s strengths lie in the focus on industry specific value drivers and their impact on the 
company’s asset value:  
1.) Development risk: The drug’s probability to successfully enter the market  
2.) Revenue potential/ commercialization risk: The revenue a drug can generate depending on 
the indication’s epidemiology, therapy prices and realizable market shares   
Weaknesses lie in the high degree of subjectivity inherited in probability/ market estimations. A 
thorough analysis requires credible data and the evaluation of different possible scenarios. 
Furthermore, development costs are practically neglected and only Peak Sales are reflected in the 
analysis. The model is not robust in financial theory but it gives valuable indications to how and 












Juno pNPV Valuation Results  
Table VIII gives valuation results for the pNPV valuation on Juno as of January 2018. (Sources: Bloomberg, Countryeconomy.com 
(2018), Global Data (2017), Global Market Insights (2017), Grand View Research (2016), Grand View Research (2018), Jadhav (2018), 
Myers and Howe (1997), Persistent Market Research (2017), Reuters, Rohan (2018), Rohan (2018a), Statista (2018), The World Bank 
(2016), Visiongain Ltd., (2017)) 
 
Juno’s pipeline has been split up into 14 separately valued assets. One of them Is JCAR017, which is 
originally part of the CD19 research series. It is currently undergoing an accelerated approval process 
with Celgene and is expected to reach the market in 2019 (Source: Thomson Reuters). Its value for 
Juno lies at about $500mn. Only four other assets have reached Phase I/II trials. Their overall 
probability weighted NPV lies at about $778mn. Another $3.4bn pNPV is derived from Phase I drug 
candidates. Excess cash is assumed to be zero because the company is expected to use its cash 
reservoirs to finance their research.  
All in all, Juno is valued at an equity value of $4.68bn, stand-alone, dated back to January 2018. 
However, this result is a purely asset-based valuation which neglects 8 of Juno’s early stage research 
projects. Peak Sales estimates are based on overall market forecasts and Juno’s projected market share 
for 2022. It is assumed that markets continue to grow at projected rates and that Juno’s partners can 
sustain its projected 2022 market share. Product cannibalization for Juno products that treat the same 
diseases have been taken into account.  
One of the main value drivers is Juno’s Lewis Y candidate, since the drug is expected to treat solid 
tumors on a market that is expected to have a size of $220bn in 2032 (Simoes, 2014). The discount 
rate used in the valuation was 10%. Though, industry WACC rates would be significantly higher due 
to equity heavy capital structures and highly volatile stock return patterns. The reason for using such 
a low rate, is that the main business risk of the company is already captured in the drug development’s 
pNPV JCAR017 $499mn
pNPV Phase I/II Candidates $778mn
pNPV Phase I Candidates $3.416mn
Enterprise Value $4.692mn
Long  term debt $10mn






success probabilities. The remaining 10% are based on practitioner’s recommendations to capture 
remaining risk factors, such as the commercialization and operating risk (Keegan, 2008).  
However, the valuation results are highly sensitive to the applied discount rate and other factors. All 
in all, the implied equity value of $4.68bn is rather optimistic due to market growth and size 
assumptions. Valuation details and analysis can be found in Appendix 10, 11 and 12.  
4.1.3 Contingent Claim Valuation 
The value of a biotechnology company can be modeled as a decision tree, leading to probability 
weighted cash flows depending on the company’s future decisions. This concept introduces flexibility 
that cannot be captured using traditional DCF models. A DCF model must assume that a drug under 
development will reach the market or apply a probability of failure as seen in 4.1.2. Using a traditional 
DCF, the risk of failure must be captured in the company’s overall discount rate (f.e. WACC/ APV).  
A contingent claim model, in contrast, portrays the company as a series of options. It includes the 
possibility to save on investment costs related to the next step of the drug development process by 
eliminating negative NPV projects. The model works by computing each year’s project cash flow 
relative to the probability of occurrence. The cash flow consists of drug development costs, operating 
costs and potential revenue inflows. Revenues are modelled using a five scenario setting with 
individualized peak sales and revenue growth patterns (Myers and Howe, 1997). The revenues are 
probability weighted for each scenario and therefore represent expectation values. The probability 
rated cash flow is discounted back to the current year.  
Table IX 
Juno Binomial Tree Valuation Results  
Table IX gives valuation results for the Contingent Claim valuation on Juno as of January 2018 without any acquisition effects. 
(Sources: Bloomberg, Countryeconomy.com (2018), Global Data (2017), Global Market Insights (2017), Grand View Research (2016), 
Grand View Research (2018), Jadhav (2018), Myers and Howe (1997), Persistent Market Research (2017), Reuters, Rohan (2018), 
Rohan (2018a), Statista (2018), The World Bank (2016), Visiongain Ltd., (2017)) 
 
NPV JCAR017 $339mn
NPV Phase I/II Candidates $855mn
NPV Phase I Candidates $5.284mn
Enterprise Value $6.478mn
Long  term debt $10mn






The model gives an overview over each project’s equity value contribution and identifies potentially 
unsuccessful projects. In the model, Juno’s enterprise value would increase about $8mn by cancelling 
their WT-1 research for Mesothelioma because the relevant market and the probability of success are 
too small to justify the research costs. All in all, the company’s equity is estimated at about $6.47bn, 
as of January 2018 (prior to the acquisition). Again, market estimates have been rather optimistic by 
applying mid-term market growth rates over a long-term period and keeping Juno’s market share at 
a forecasted 2022 value. More detailed information on Juno’s binomial tree valuation is given in 
Appendix 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17.  
4.2 Celgene  
4.2.1 Relative Valuation 
Celgene names a variety of competitors with cell related and non-cell related product backgrounds in 
their annual report 2017 (2018f). According to cluster analysis, their closest peers are AbbVie Inc, 
Johnson & Johnson and Novartis AG. Like Celgene, Johnson & Johnson and Novartis AG shares 
have both lost in value over the last twelve months. AbbVie has seen moderate increases in share 
price.  
Table X 
Celgene Peer Group 
Table X estimates implied equity valuations for Juno based on peer group multiples (FY2017 data) (Sources: Bloomberg, Thomson 
Reuters) 
 
Celgene was traded at a price of $102.65 on the 19th January 2018, representing a market 
capitalization of approximately $78bn. Peer group comparison reveals that they have been traded at 
a premium of up to 49% for most given multiple metrics. Whilst Novartis AG is traded on an EBITDA 
multiple of about 15, Celgene is traded on an EBITDA multiple of about 20. A possible explanation 
of this is Celgene’s outstanding operating growth in the last years and the reflected future growth 




EV/ EBITDA 14x 15x 55.50 57.44 -28.82% -26.34%
EV/ EBIT 19x 18x 65.68 62.19 -15.77% -20.24%
Price/ EPS 21x 22x 66.97 71.21 -14.11% -8.67%




















4.2.2 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
Celgene’s Gross Profit margin lay between 95% and 96% in the last fiscal years. Their outstanding 
debt has been issued at interest rates as low as just above 2%. Like Juno, the company’s main value 
drivers lie in the successful development of their R&D pipeline and the commercialization of existing 
products. The Celgene DCF model is based on revenue estimations for the five different product and 
candidate categories given in the Celgene company profile and on revenue estimations for products 
that have not entered the market, yet. The five categories are:  
- Bestseller 
- Degenerating Products 
- Growth Prospects 
- Late Stage Candidates 
- Early Stage Candidates 
Revenue forecasts for Celgene’s existing product are forecasted in line with patent expirations and 
pending approval requests for alternative indications. As a result, the bestseller REVLIMID® reaches 
its peak sales before patent expiry in 2021. Thereafter, sales from pending REVLIMID® FDA 
requests are expected to buffer revenue degeneration. In a similar fashion, degenerating products 
are modeled to lose close to 8% in revenue per year over the forecasted period. Growth 
prospects are expected to reach peak sales in 2024 and grow at an average of 1.88% per year 
between 2018 and 2030.  
The revenue estimation for drug candidates was conducted in a different fashion. Late stage 
candidates are expected to reach the market from 2019 onwards. Revenue estimates are based 
on specialist reports, analyst estimates and company information. The product group is 
expected to reach peak sales in 2026. The average growth in revenue lies at about 10%. Early 
stage candidates include a variety of Phase I/ early stage II candidates. Similar to the pNPV 
approach for Juno, their revenues have been probability weighted to cover the additional risk that is not represented in Celgene’s overall WACC. Those 15 candidates are expected to 
generate fast growing revenues from 2024 onwards and do not reach peak sales in the 
forecasted period until 2030. As a result, Celgene’s revenues are expected to increase in the 
next years with a revenue growth gap between 2021 and 2024. 
Revenue forecasts for Bestseller and Degenerating Products can be considered moderately  
accurate because these products have already been on the market for a considerable time. 
Expected forecast accuracy naturally decreases for the remaining product groups due to 
development and commercialization hurdles that have to be passed over the forecasted period 
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from 8 to . As a result, the valuation’s degree of uncertainty decreases with increasing 
revenue components. Appendix 19 shows data on Celgene’s revenue estimates.  
Operational margins have been kept at past year averages, since there is no information that would 
indicate significant changes. The capital structure is held constant throughout the valuation. Celgene 
has conducted share repurchases in the past. This model was changed into a dividend payout model 
since forecasting share repurchases would require a variety of practically unpredictable variables (f.e. 
timing and share price development). Assets and working capital grow relative to revenues. The cost 
of equity has been derived as an average of historical and peer group implicated rates. The US 30-
year-treasury yield has been used as the risk-free rate. More detailed information about Celgene’s 
DCF valuation can be found in Appendix 20 to Appendix 26.  
Figure X 
Celgene Discounted Cash Flow Valuation Results  
Figure X gives results for Celgene’s DCF valuation as of January 2018. The graph breaks down Celgene’s share price contribution into 
five product- and candidate types according to their degree of maturity. (Sources: Bloomberg, Campbell (2017), Countryeconomy.com 
(2018), Global Data (2016), Global Data (2017), Global Market Insights (2017), Grand View Research (2016), Grand View Research 
(2018), Jadhav (2018), Kolaczkowski (2017), Lawrennce (2016), MacKay and Zheng (2017), Myers and Howe (1997), Persistent 
Market Research (2017), Reuters, Rohan (2018), Rohan (2018a), Staines (2018), Statista (2018), Supid ( 2015), The World Bank 
(2016), Visiongain Ltd., (2017), Wood (2018)) 
 
Figure X shows Celgene’s share price development under different revenue scenarios. In a scenario 
where all revenues solely consist of REVLIMID®, their share would be worth $23.78. Revenues 

























to a price of $44.48. The valuation yields additional $27.15 per share for Late Stage Candidates 
and $34.97 for Early Stage Candidates.  Celgene’s shares should have therefore been worth $106.60 in a top scenario including all 
products and candidates at given revenue estimations, as of 19th January 2018.  
4.3 Synergies and Merged Firm 
Synergies are found where the value of both firms’ added value is increased through the transaction. 
Using discounted cash flow valuation logic, Devos et. al. express this mathematically as follows 
(2009):  � =  � � � ,�+� − � � � ,� − � � � ,� 
The total value of synergies is equal to the value of the merged firm minus the independent present 
value of both firms before the merger. There are different approaches to categorize the sources of 
synergy. The following five categories are one possible way to do so (Eccles, Lanes and Wilson, 
1999): 
- Cost savings  
- Revenue enhancements  
- Process improvements  
- Financial engineering  
- Tax benefits  
The valuation can be conducted based on value line forecasts, using forward looking financial 
statements to arrive at the calculation as seen above. However, previous chapters have argued that 
the best way to break down Juno’s value is to estimate revenue generation potential using probability 
weighted cash flows or real options approaches on their intangible asset base, instead of traditional 
DCF valuation. This approach has already summarized the value of Juno’s operations on a product 
level. Following this logic, the operational synergy valuation process (Costs, Revenues and Process 
improvement synergies) should start at Juno’s asset values as a stand-alone company and compare it 
to the value that could be generated from these assets as part of the Celgene group. In other words: 
how does Juno’s asset value increase, using Celgene’s business infrastructure? 
Juno is a company that does not possess any capacities to manufacture and commercialize 
pharmaceutical goods. They capitalize on their assets by letting external partners produce goods based 
on their research efforts. In this way, Juno is just receiving a royalty contribution on the drugs overall 
profit. As part of Celgene, all revenues related to Juno products can be internalized at Celgene’s profit 
scheme. These additional revenues make up the majority of synergies. Since Juno is expected to 
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continue their operations as an independent Celgene subsidiary, major cost cuttings or process 
changes cannot be expected.  
Celgene and Juno already engaged in a contract that allows Celgene to market Juno’s CD19 and 
CD22 line exclusively. As a result, cash flows related to CD22 and CD19 product candidates have 
been with the companies prior to the merger. The contract contains a profit split, milestone payments, 
upfront payments and other payment schemes. The actual split between both companies should 
therefore be close to a common market rate of 15% revenue, which was used in the previous chapters 
to calculate company revenues. It follows that synergies for CD19 and CD22 drug candidates should 
practically be zero. In fact, the synergy calculation yields negative synergies for these research 
modules. The reason for this is that pNPV and binomial valuation makes use of common 
biotechnology profit ratios that differ from Celgene’s profit structure. Also, the calculations behind 
those valuation schemes might factor in abandoning options or differ in the probability valuation/ 
discounting process. Mathematically, the calculations therefore yield different results.  
Juno’s equity value is the average of pNPV and binomial valuation on candidate and firm level. The 
premerger equity value for the acquirer represents royalties that Celgene would derive from Juno 
through existing contracts. The calculated synergies mainly emerged through the internalization of 
revenues from prior licensing partners. In some cases, Juno has agreed to pay revenue royalties to 
their licensee partners. One example for this is the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center that has 
been supporting Juno in their WT-1 research module development. Those cash outflows have been 
considered, as far as they were public and foreseeable.  �  � = $ 8,  − $ ,  − $ ,  = $ , ��  
As a result, about $10.1bn in operating synergies are derived from the merger. The synergies are 
calculated on rather optimistic market forecasts. As mentioned before, revenue estimations have been 
made upon a variety of optimistic assumptions. Therefore, the given synergies should be at the 
estimation range’s top end. More detailed information on operational synergies can be found in 
Appendix 27. 
Financial Synergies can be found when the merged firms WACC decreases through an increase in 
leverage and risk diversification or through the possibility to refinance the target’s existing debt at 
the acquirer’s lower debt refinancing rate without increasing the merged companies cost of debt. 
However, Juno is almost solely equity financed and there are no reasons to expect the company’s 
overall WACC to decrease. Finally, tax synergies might emerge by deducting Juno’s losses carried 
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forward from Celgene’s earnings before taxes. Under the premise, that all of Juno’s accumulated 
losses may be carried forward and may be fully deducted from EBT in 2018 at Celgene’s tax rate and 
discounted by their Cost of debt. Tax synergies are calculated as follows:  
  �  =  � ′   ∗ ′    8+ ′      
Under the reasonable assumption, that Celgene’s EBT will extend Juno’s accumulated losses, the 
merger’s tax benefits are a discounted cash flow value of about $251mn. Total Synergies therefore 
amount to $10.398mn for 100% of the firm’s equity, excluding transaction costs.  
Figure XI 
Premium Analysis and Synergies 
Figure XI provides a premium and synergy analysis for Celgene and Juno.   
 
Assuming transaction costs at 1% of the purchase price ($90mn), the transaction added a value of 
$4,401mn to the target’s shareholders and a value of $5,907mn to the acquirer’s shareholders for 
the whole firm. The acquisition was conducted using cash, only. Therefore, their share price can 










Value to target 
shareholders 
$5,907mn























Figure XII provides the merged firm’s share price contribution from products, candidates and synergies.    
 
Synergies from the Celgene acquisition add a total of $7.78 in synergies to Celgene’s share price. 
The merged firm’s overall value lies at a top range valuation of $114.38 per share.  
  



































5. Conclusion: Celgene – a biopharmaceutical research network  
Biopharmaceutical acquisitions are risky by nature. An early stage, research oriented, company in 
this industry usually does not provide positive cash flows as far as 5 or 10 years in the future, if ever. 
Their commercial value depends not only on the capability to successfully expand the borders of 
medicine as we know it today, but also to be the first and/or the best to do so. Evaluating this ability 
requires a high degree of scientific know how and market knowledge. Who else is pursuing similar 
research projects? What is there current state of development? How many incidents will be diagnosed 
for relevant medical conditions? How are prescriptions going to be affected? Is reimbursement going 
to change on a legislative level? What price can be negotiated with customers in regards of demand, 
competition and pricing power? 
As a consequence, traditional DCF models lose their power. They are too stagnant and the information 
required lies too far ahead in the future compared to the companies’ short history and the variety of 
possible scenarios. The given thesis has therefore brought forward arguments to conduct a rather asset 
based valuation on Juno and to frame the acquisition as an asset enhancement.  
The valuation of both companies has shown that Celgene was almost fairly priced by the market with 
a slight upside potential. Their actual share price of $102.65 only diverges 3.8% from the price found 
in a stand-alone DCF valuation. Juno’s stand-alone equity value was estimated at about $5.6bn, or a 
share price of approximately $48.02, diverging around 18% from the actual pre acquisition market 
price. However, this is likely going to be related to the looming merger with Celgene. The 
acquisition’s synergies have are estimated at a value of just above $10bn, pushing Celgene’s share 
price potential up to a value of $114.38.  
Celgene’s vivid engagement into a broad variety of research and development collaborations can be 
seen as a risk diversification strategy. The company reserves itself the option to continue promising 
research and commercialize successful candidates while others can be divested at any given time. 
Successful candidates then take advantage on Celgene’s commercial network and manufacturing 
capabilities. This strategy is based on the notion that profits from one successful research candidate 
can possibly make up for sunken costs in a dozen of failed projects. In that sense, Celgene 
accumulates know-how from a variety of directions and decides which part of it to extend and which 
part of it to abandon. As fully owned subsidiary of Celgene, Juno’s research efforts can know be 
coordinated and channeled by Celgene and their results can be combined with the outcome of other 
research projects. Perhaps, the establishment of such an interdependent research network can be 




Appendix 1: Decision Tree for Pharmaceutical Development (Kellogg, Charnes and Demirer, 2000) 
 
 







Buyoutits own managers and 
outside investors
Target firm continues to exist, but as a private 
business. It is usually accomplished with a tender 
offer. 
A firm can be 
acquired by
Target firm becomes part of acquiring firm; 
stockholder approval needed from both firms
Target firm and acquiring firm become
new firm; stockholder approval needed
from both firms.
Target firm continues to exist, as long as there are 
dissident stockholders holding out. Successfull 
tender offers ultimately become mergers. 
Target firm remains as shell company, but its assets 
are transferred to the acquiring firm. Ultmiately, 
target firm is liquidated.
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Appendix 3: Success and failure characteristics in M&A (Bruner, 2005) 
 
 
















Returns to buyers likely will be higher if: Returns to buyers likely will be lower if: 
1.  Strategic Motivation 1.  Opportunistic motivation
2.  Value acquiring 2.  Momentum growth/ glamour acquiring
3.  Focused/ related acquiring 3.  Lack of focus/ unrelated diversification
4.  Credible Synergies 4.  Incredible Synergies
5.  To use excess cash profitably 5.  Just to use excess cash
6.  Negotiated purchases of private firms 6.  Auctions of public firms
7.  Cross Border for special advantage 7.  Cross border naively
8.  Go hostile 8.  Negotiate with resistant target
9.  Buy during cold M&A markets 9.  Buy during hot M&A markets 
10. Pay with cash 10. Pay with stock
11. High tax benefits to buyer 11. Low tax benefits to buyer 
12. Finance with debt judiciously 12. Over-lever
13. Stage the payments (earnouts) 13. Pay full up-front
14. Mergers of equals 14. Not a merger of equals
15. Managers have significant stake 15. Managers have low or no stake
16. Shareholder-oriented management 16. Entrenched management
17. Active investors 17. Passive investors
18. Big good deals 18. Big bad deals
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Appendix 5: Porter’s five forces analysis for the biopharmaceutical industry  
1.)  Threat of 
new Entrants: 
  
Entering the market for cancer related drugs requires a high degree 
of specialized knowledge. On top of that, significant funding is 
required to finance exhaustive periods of research and development. 
LOW 
2.)  Power of 
Suppliers  
  
Pharmaceutical companies usually require basic chemical 
compounds to produce their goods, which are provided by a variety 
of suppliers. Biotechnological companies do often not manufacture 
any tangible products at all. Their supply consists of highly 
specialized research equipment. The market for such goods is 
usually balanced because supply and demand are equally 
concentrated. 
LOW 
3.)  Power of 
Buyers: 
  
As a producer of pharmaceutical goods, consumers do only have 
very little pricing power due to (amongst other reasons) intellectual 
protection rights, as explained in chapter 3.1.5. 
LOW 
4.)  Availability 
of Substitutes  
  
The availability of substitutes depends on the drug’s performance 
and market timing compared to other treatment options. “first-in-
class” and “best-in-class” face a very low substitution risk until a 
more innovative drug is discovered or until generic products enter 
the market. 
MEDIUM 
5.)  Competitive 
Rivalry:  
  
High dependence on intellectual property leads to a cut throat 
competition in research and development. Especially in the 
biotechnology sector, dozens of companies might research similar 
therapy systems with only a few of them successfully 














Appendix 6: Celgene company information (Sources: Thomson Reuters, Celgene Corporation, 2018f) 
 
Name:  Celgene Corporation  
Incorporation:   1986 
Industry:  Biopharmaceuticals  
Stock listing:  NASDAQ 
Products:  Drugs for the treatments for medical conditions in the areas of 
Hematology/ blood disorders, Oncology, Inflammations and 
Immunological diseases 
Locations:   Headquarters in Summit, New Jersey (USA). Manufacturing facilities 
in Phoenix, Arizona (USA) and Switzerland. Variety of offices in other 
parts of the USA.  
Headcount:  About 7500 employees  
Size:   Enterprise value at about $70bn7  
Assets: 
 
 Book value of assets at about $30bn. Therein cash, cash equivalent 
securities and marketable securities for sale at about $12bn and 
intangible assets at about $8bn.  
Capital:  Total shareholders’ equity at a book value of about $7bn (Market 
capitalization ca. $66bn). Long term debt is accounted for at about 
$16bn, net of discount with a par value of ca. $20bn. Almost all of 
Celgene’s debt was issued in bond tranches with maturities between 
2019 and 2048. 
 
Appendix 7: Juno company information (Sources: Thomson Reuters, Juno Therapeutics)  
 
Name:  Juno Therapeutics, Inc. 
Incorporation:   2013 
 
Industry:  Biotechnology/ Biopharmaceuticals 
Stock listing:  NASDAQ 
Products:  Licenses and patents used in drug development processes.  
Locations:   Headquarters in Seattle, Washington (USA), administrative 
facilities in Germany and a small variety of offices in other parts of 
the USA.  
Headcount:  About 660 employees  
Size:   Acquired by Celgene at an Equity Value of about $10bn. 
Assets: 
 
 Book value of assets at about $1.5bn. Therein cash, cash equivalent 
securities and marketable securities at about $730mn. 
Capital:  Total shareholders’ equity at a book value of about $ bn with an 
additional $2.3bn paid-in-capital and accumulated losses of 
$2.3bn. Long term debt is accounted for at about $9mn.  
 
 
                                                 
7 As of 2nd May 2018. 
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Appendix 8: CAR and TCR System (Juno Therapeutics Inc., 2018) 
 
Appendix 9: Juno cluster analysis and peer group data  
 
 
Company Ticker EV/ Revenue EV/ R&D exp. EV/ Book Value Employees EV #Employees R&D exp. Assets  Revenue
Bluebird Inc BLUE.O 219.46 28.32 4.09 22.21 $7,774,818,037 350 $274,567,000 $1,900,567,000 $35,427,000
Incyte Corp INCY.O 7.93 9.18 5.29 20.30 $12,179,713,278 600 $1,326,361,000 $2,302,582,000 $1,536,216,000
Ziopharm Onc. Inc ZIOP.O 114.40 16.21 6.92 15.89 $730,929,084 46 $45,084,000 $105,606,000 $6,389,000
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Appendix 10: Juno pNPV assumptions 
 
 























for Phase I/II 23% Average
Success rates 
for Phase I 17% Average
Profitability 60% 20% Keegan 15% Keegan
Discount rate 10% 30% Abrantes-Metz 26% Abrantes-Metz
Pharma PE 17 10% CMR 14% CMR
Royalty Rate FHCRC 5% 22% DiMasi 7% DiMasi
32% MBC 22% MBC
Universal Phase I/II Phase I
Drug Candidates Indication Status
Years to 
Launch

























Leukemia Phase I/II 8 13 23% $2,311 mn $523 mn 15% 60% 47.10 3.45 $232 mn $232 mn
WT-1: JTCR016
Acute Myeloid 
Leukemia Phase I/II 8 13 23% $7,061 mn $1,599 mn 10% 60% 95.95 3.45 $473 mn $473 mn
WT-1: JTCR016
Non-Small Cell 
Lung Cancer Phase I/II 8 13 23% $1,022 mn $232 mn 10% 60% 13.89 3.45 $68 mn $68 mn
WT-1: JTCR016 Mesothelioma Phase I/II 8 13 23% $77 mn $17 mn 10% 60% 1.05 3.45 $5 mn $5 mn
CD19: Liso-cel
Non-Hodgkins 
Lymphoma Phase I 9 14 17% $1,262 mn $212 mn 15% 60% 19.09 3.80 $85 mn $85 mn
CD19: JCAR014 with Durvalumab
Non-hodgkin 
Lymphoma Phase I 9 14 17% $1,262 mn $212 mn 15% 60% 19.09 3.80 $85 mn
CD22: JCAR018 Fully-Human scFv 
Non-hodgkin 
Lymphoma Phase I 9 14 17% $1,262 mn $212 mn 15% 60% 19.09 3.80 $85 mn
BCMA: JCARH125 
Multiple 
Myeloma Phase I 9 14 17% $3,342 mn $561 mn 15% 60% 50.53 3.80 $226 mn $226 mn
BCMA: MCARH171 & FCARH143 
Multiple 
Myeloma Phase I 9 14 17% $3,342 mn $561 mn 15% 60% 50.53 3.80 $226 mn
L1CAM: JCAR023 
Pediatric 
Neuroblastoma Phase I 9 14 17% $7,926 mn $1,332 mn 15% 60% 119.84 3.80 $536 mn $536 mn




breast cancer Phase I 9 14 17% $5,622 mn $945 mn 15% 60% 85.01 3.80 $381 mn $381 mn
Lewis Y Solid Tumors Phase I 9 14 17% $19,626 mn $3,297 mn 15% 60% 296.75 3.80 $1,328 mn $1,328 mn
























Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Breakthrough 2.27% 21.15% 21.15% 21.15% 21.15% 58.92% 58.92% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 83.09% 75.53% 71.76% 66.47% 62.69% 59.67% 58.54% 45.32% 35.50%
Above Average 4.53% 31.72% 31.72% 31.72% 61.18% 61.18% 61.18% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 78.55% 75.53% 72.51% 67.98% 61.94% 58.92% 57.41% 45.32% 49.10%
Average 7.55% 45.32% 45.32% 45.32% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 90.63% 90.63% 83.08% 83.08% 83.08% 60.42% 60.42% 45.32% 45.32%
Below Average 13.44% 26.88% 26.88% 40.32% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 87.37% 80.65% 67.20% 67.20% 67.20% 47.04% 47.04% 26.88% 26.88%








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Breakthrough drug revenue as % of peak sales
Above average drug revenue as % of peak sales
Average drug revenue as % of peak sales
Below average drug revenue as % of peak sales
Dog drug revenue as % of peak sales
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Discovery 1 $2.20 mn 60% 10%
Pre-clinical 3 $13.80 mn 90%
Phase I 1 $2.80 mn 75%
Phase II 2 $6.40 mn 50%
Phase III 3 $18.10 mn 85%
FDA Filing 3 $3.30 mn 75%
Post-Approval 9 $31.20 mn 100%
Stage t in years Cost per year 
Discounted 
Cost per year
Discovery 1 $2.20 mn -$2.00 tn
Pre-clinical 2 $4.60 mn -$3.80 tn
Pre-clinical 3 $4.60 mn -$3.46 tn
Pre-clinical 4 $4.60 mn -$3.14 tn
Phase I 5 $2.80 mn -$1.74 tn
Phase II 6 $3.20 mn -$1.81 tn
Phase II 7 $3.20 mn -$1.64 tn
Phase III 8 $6.03 mn -$2.81 tn
Phase III 9 $6.03 mn -$2.56 tn
Phase III 10 $6.03 mn -$2.33 tn
FDA Filing 11 $1.10 mn -$.39 tn
FDA Filing 12 $1.10 mn -$.35 tn
FDA Filing 13 $1.10 mn -$.32 tn
Post-Approval 14 $3.47 mn -$.91 tn
Post-Approval 15 $3.47 mn -$.83 tn
Post-Approval 16 $3.47 mn -$.75 tn
Post-Approval 17 $3.47 mn -$.69 tn
Post-Approval 18 $3.47 mn -$.62 tn
Post-Approval 19 $3.47 mn -$.57 tn
Post-Approval 20 $3.47 mn -$.52 tn
Post-Approval 21 $3.47 mn -$.47 tn
Post-Approval 22 $3.47 mn -$.43 tn
Scenario Probability
Peak Sales as a 
multiplier of 
average scenario
Tax rate Royalty rate
Breakthrough 10% 20.00x 30% 15%
Above Average 10% 10.00x
Average 60% 1.00x
Below Average 10% .11x
Dog 10% .10x
Cost as % of revenue
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
COGS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Marketing Expenses 100% 50% 25% 25% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
G&A 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10% 11.10%
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Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Probability weighted Development Outflow $.89 mn $1.86 mn $1.86 mn $1.86 mn $1.13 mn $1.30 mn $1.30 mn $2.44 mn $2.44 mn $2.44 mn $.45 mn
Probability weighted Revenue Inflow $52.82 mn $386.36 mn
Probability Weighted Cost Outflow $58.68 mn $236.07 mn
Probability weighted CF before Tax -$.89 mn -$1.86 mn -$1.86 mn -$1.86 mn -$1.13 mn -$1.30 mn -$1.30 mn -$2.44 mn -$2.44 mn -$8.31 mn $149.85 mn
Probability weighted CF after Tax -$.89 mn -$1.86 mn -$1.86 mn -$1.86 mn -$1.13 mn -$1.30 mn -$1.30 mn -$2.44 mn -$2.44 mn -$8.31 mn $104.89 mn
pNPVt -$.81 mn -$1.54 mn -$1.40 mn -$1.27 mn -$.70 mn -$.73 mn -$.67 mn -$1.14 mn -$1.04 mn -$3.20 mn $52.52 mn
pNPV cumulated -$.81 mn -$2.35 mn -$3.75 mn -$5.02 mn -$5.73 mn -$6.46 mn -$7.12 mn -$8.26 mn -$9.30 mn -$12.50 mn $40.02 mn
Stage Discovery Pre-clinical Phase I Phase II Phase III FDA Filing
Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
$.45 mn $.45 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn $1.40 mn
$386.93 mn $387.51 mn $629.35 mn $916.39 mn $916.39 mn $1,376.16 mn $1,376.16 mn $1,376.16 mn $1,376.16 mn $1,376.16 mn $1,376.16 mn $1,143.86 mn $1,074.40 mn $1,016.13 mn $958.15 mn $905.91 mn $818.93 mn $804.29 mn $622.31 mn $561.45 mn
$139.68 mn $139.89 mn $195.73 mn $285.00 mn $285.00 mn $427.99 mn $427.99 mn $427.99 mn $427.99 mn $427.99 mn $427.99 mn $126.97 mn $119.26 mn $112.79 mn $106.35 mn $100.56 mn $90.90 mn $89.28 mn $69.08 mn $62.32 mn
$246.80 mn $247.17 mn $432.22 mn $629.99 mn $629.99 mn $946.77 mn $946.77 mn $946.77 mn $946.77 mn $946.77 mn $946.77 mn $1,015.49 mn $953.74 mn $901.94 mn $850.39 mn $803.95 mn $726.63 mn $713.61 mn $551.83 mn $497.73 mn
$172.76 mn $173.02 mn $302.55 mn $440.99 mn $440.99 mn $662.74 mn $662.74 mn $662.74 mn $662.74 mn $662.74 mn $662.74 mn $710.84 mn $667.62 mn $631.35 mn $595.27 mn $562.76 mn $508.64 mn $499.53 mn $386.28 mn $348.41 mn
$78.64 mn $71.60 mn $113.82 mn $150.81 mn $137.10 mn $187.31 mn $170.29 mn $154.80 mn $140.73 mn $127.94 mn $116.31 mn $113.41 mn $96.83 mn $83.25 mn $71.35 mn $61.32 mn $50.39 mn $44.99 mn $31.62 mn $25.93 mn
$118.66 mn $190.26 mn $304.07 mn $454.89 mn $591.99 mn $779.30 mn $949.59 mn $1,104.39 mn $1,245.12 mn $1,373.06 mn $1,489.37 mn $1,602.78 mn $1,699.61 mn $1,782.85 mn $1,854.20 mn $1,915.53 mn $1,965.91 mn $2,010.90 mn $2,042.52 mn $2,068.45 mn
Post-Approval
Fail





CD19: JCAR017 (pNPV valuated + Analyst recomendations)
Non-Hodgkins 
Lymphoma & B Cell 
Lymphoma Fast Track $679 mn
CD19: Liso-cel
Chronic Lymphocytic 
Leukemia Phase I/II $258 mn $258 mn
WT-1: JTCR016
Acute Myeloid 
Leukemia Phase I/II $539 mn $539 mn
WT-1: JTCR016
Non-Small Cell Lung 
Cancer Phase I/II $66 mn $66 mn
WT-1: JTCR016 Mesothelioma Phase I/II -$8 mn -$8 mn
CD19: Liso-cel
Non-Hodgkins 
Lymphoma Phase I $121 mn $121 mn
CD19: JCAR014 with Durvalumab
Non-hodgkin 
Lymphoma Phase I $121 mn
CD22: JCAR018 Fully-Human scFv 
Non-hodgkin 
Lymphoma Phase I $121 mn
BCMA: JCARH125 Multiple Myeloma Phase I $343 mn $343 mn
BCMA: MCARH171 & FCARH143 Multiple Myeloma Phase I $343 mn
L1CAM: JCAR023 
Pediatric 
Neuroblastoma Phase I $832 mn $832 mn
MUC16 & IL-12: JCAR020 "Armored" CAR Ovarian Phase I $1,027 mn $1,027 mn
ROR1: JCAR024
Non-small cell lung 
cancer/ breast cancer Phase I $586 mn $586 mn
Lewis Y Solid Tumors Phase I $2,082 mn $2,082 mn















FY2015(A) FY2016(A) FY2017(A) 2018(F) 2019(F) 2020(F) 2021(F) 2022(F) 2023(F) 2024(F) 2025(F) 2026(F) 2027(F) 2028(F) 2029(F) 2030(F)
Bestseller $5,801mn $6,974mn $8,187mn $9,365mn $10,432mn $11,308mn $11,918mn $9,902mn $9,002mn $8,552mn $7,922mn $7,472mn $7,112mn $6,688mn $6,321mn $5,978mn
Growth Prospects $1,455mn $2,328mn $2,913mn $3,336mn $3,380mn $4,834mn $5,445mn $5,646mn $5,646mn $5,822mn $5,822mn $4,997mn $4,890mn $4,724mn $4,563mn $4,173mn
Degenerating Products $1,896mn $1,879mn $1,864mn $1,730mn $1,503mn $1,432mn $1,372mn $1,282mn $1,192mn $1,123mn $1,043mn $970mn $910mn $852mn $779mn $725mn
Late Stage Candidates $mn $mn $mn $mn $3,046mn $5,954mn $5,963mn $6,831mn $7,559mn $9,140mn $9,140mn $10,005mn $9,627mn $9,439mn $8,927mn $8,627mn
Early Stage Candidates $78mn $3,926mn $3,982mn $7,189mn $8,955mn $12,944mn $19,321mn
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
REVLIMID® $5,801mn $6,974mn $8,187mn $9,365mn $10,432mn $11,308mn $11,918mn $9,902mn $9,002mn $8,552mn $7,922mn $7,472mn $7,112mn $6,688mn $6,321mn $5,978mn
POMALYST®/IMNOVID® $983mn $1,311mn $1,614mn $1,614mn $1,614mn $2,638mn $2,638mn $2,638mn $2,638mn $2,638mn $2,638mn $2,072mn $1,993mn $1,913mn $1,793mn $1,634mn
OTEZLA® $472mn $1,017mn $1,279mn $1,279mn $1,279mn $1,685mn $1,685mn $1,685mn $1,685mn $1,685mn $1,685mn $1,425mn $1,398mn $1,312mn $1,271mn $1,214mn
IDHIFA® $20mn $443mn $487mn $511mn $1,123mn $1,323mn $1,323mn $1,499mn $1,499mn $1,499mn $1,499mn $1,499mn $1,499mn $1,325mn
ABRAXANE® $967mn $973mn $992mn $992mn $779mn $749mn $719mn $674mn $614mn $584mn $545mn $508mn $477mn $446mn $417mn $390mn
VIDAZA® $591mn $608mn $628mn $493mn $474mn $455mn $427mn $389mn $370mn $345mn $322mn $302mn $282mn $264mn $247mn $231mn
azacitidine for injection $84mn $66mn $36mn $33mn $33mn $30mn $30mn $30mn $22mn $20mn $17mn $15mn $13mn $11mn $9mn $8mn
THALOMID® $185mn $152mn $132mn $132mn $132mn $112mn $110mn $103mn $100mn $95mn $80mn $74mn $67mn $59mn $54mn $48mn
ISTODAX® $69mn $80mn $76mn $80mn $85mn $86mn $86mn $86mn $86mn $78mn $78mn $72mn $72mn $72mn $52mn $47mn
BB2121 $862mn $1,464mn $1,464mn $1,464mn $1,464mn $1,464mn $1,464mn $1,216mn $1,105mn
CC-486 $17mn $92mn $101mn $107mn $234mn $276mn $276mn $312mn $329mn $405mn $414mn $419mn
JCAR017 $50mn $548mn $548mn $548mn $548mn $1,528mn $1,528mn $2,593mn $2,593mn $2,593mn $2,593mn $2,593mn
LUSPATERCEPT $34mn $313mn $313mn $313mn $313mn $873mn $873mn $1,482mn $1,482mn $1,482mn $1,482mn $1,482mn
OZANIMOD $2,946mn $5,000mn $5,000mn $5,000mn $5,000mn $5,000mn $5,000mn $4,154mn $3,777mn $3,588mn $3,323mn $3,135mn
CC-90006 $2mn $7mn $37mn $109mn $244mn $518mn
JTX - 2011 $223mn $425mn $557mn $591mn $1,252mn $1,252mn
LYC-55716 $804mn $804mn $1,533mn $2,011mn $2,133mn $4,520mn
LYC-30937 $33mn $63mn $83mn $88mn $186mn $186mn $186mn
ACY-241 $239mn $161mn $307mn $403mn $427mn $905mn
OMP-131R10 $1,406mn $396mn $1,804mn $2,366mn $2,509mn $5,317mn
ABX-1431 $201mn $136mn $258mn $339mn $360mn $762mn
Cereblon Modulator: CC-220 $12mn $23mn $30mn $32mn $68mn $68mn $68mn
GED-0301 $33mn $63mn $83mn $88mn $186mn $186mn $186mn
BET Inhibitor: CC-90010 $21mn $40mn $53mn $56mn $118mn $118mn
PAN-IDH Inhibitor: AG-881 -$66mn $8mn $10mn $11mn $23mn $23mn
LSD1 Inhibitor: CC-90011 $946mn $1,804mn $2,366mn $2,509mn $5,317mn $5,317mn
CD19 series without JCAR017 $6mn $52mn $95mn $95mn $124mn











Bestseller Growth Prospects Degenerating Products
Late Stage Candidates Early Stage Candidates
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Appendix 20: Celgene DCF discount factors  
 
 
Appendix 21: Celgene DCF forecast assumptions 
 
 
Peer Name Levered Beta Debt Market CapTax Rate Unlevered Beta
AbbVie Inc 1.62 32,499 153,975 35% 1.42
Johnson & Johnson 0.74 32,299 374,802 35% 0.70
Novartis AG 1.06 23,224 195,996 35% 0.98
Asset Beta 1.04
D/E Target Ratio 20%
Corporate Tax rate (Tc) 35%
Equity Beta (Peer Group) 1.17
Equity Beta (Historical) 1.46
risk free rate (rf) 3.13%
Market risk premium 5.50%
Cost of Equity Peer Group (CoEQp) 9.57%
Cost of Equity Historical (CoEQh) 11.16%
Cost of Equity (Average) 10.37%
Interest Expenses on Debt 3.52%
Tax rate 20%
After-tax Cost of Debt 2.80%
Shares outstanding 759
Share price 104.36
Total Equity (Market Cap) 79,241





Terminal Growth Rate (g) 2.00%
Exit Multiple 17x
2015(A) 2016(A) 2017(A) 2018(F) 2019(F) 2020(F) 2021(F) 2022(F) 2023(F) 2024(F) 2025(F) 2026(F) 2027(F) 2028(F) 2029(F) 2030(F)
Operations
COGS/ Revenue 4.5% 3.9% 3.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
SG&A/ Revenue 24.9% 23.7% 20.2% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9% 22.9%
R&D/ Revenue 39.9% 39.8% 45.5% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7%
Other operating/ Revenue 2.84% 3.46% -7.61% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4%
Working Capital
DSO (Receivables) 56 61 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
DIO (Inventory) 385 415 428 409 409 409 409 409 409 409 409 409 409 409 409 409
Prepaid Expenses/ Revenue 0.00% 0.35% 0.32% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Other Current Assets/ Revenue 10.64% 4.31% 1.26% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4%
DPO (Accounts Payable) 209 206 241 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219
Accrued Expenses/ SG&A 71.3% 79.6% 92.2% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0% 81.0%
Other Current Liabilities/ Revenue 0.9% 0.9% 2.0% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26%
Long Term Assets
Depreciation/ PPE FY-1 14.88% 14.41% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64% 14.64%
Amortization/ Intangible Assets FY-1 3.53% 3.24% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39% 3.39%
CAPEX long term assets/ Revenue 3.09% 2.10% 2.15% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45%
Capital & Financing
Cash/ Revenue 70.8% 71.0% 92.6% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12% 78.12%
Tax/ EBIT 18.41% 13.25% 29.47% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38%
Tax/ EBT 20.85% 15.73% 31.85% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00%
Interest Expenses/ Long Term Debt 2.6% 4.0% 3.5% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36%
Dividends payout ratio 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Interest Income/ Cash + Sht. Inv. 1.22% 1.42% 1.27% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30%
Other ratios
Other non-operating income/ revenue 0.25% -0.11% 0.43% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19%
Other investing cash flow items/ revenue 64.53% 6.82% 20.09% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48% 30.48%
Financing Cash Flow Items/ Revenue 3.15% 1.32% 0.00% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49%
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Appendix 22: Celgene DCF income statement  
 
Appendix 23: Celgene DCF assets 
 
Appendix 24: Celgene DCF capital  
 
Appendix 25: Celgene DCF free cash flow to firm 
 
 
2015(A) 2016(A) 2017(A) 2018(F) 2019(F) 2020(F) 2021(F) 2022(F) 2023(F) 2024(F) 2025(F) 2026(F) 2027(F) 2028(F) 2029(F) 2030(F)
Revenue (All Products & Candidates) 9,256 11,229 13,003 14,431 18,361 23,529 24,698 23,661 23,399 24,715 27,852 27,426 29,729 30,657 33,534 38,825
Cost of Goods Sold 420 438 461 576 733 940 987 945 935 987 1,113 1,096 1,188 1,225 1,340 1,551
Gross Profit 8,836 10,791 12,542 13,855 17,628 22,589 23,712 22,716 22,464 23,728 26,740 26,330 28,541 29,432 32,194 37,274
Selling, General & Administration 2,305 2,658 2,626 3,308 4,209 5,393 5,662 5,424 5,364 5,665 6,385 6,287 6,815 7,027 7,687 8,900
Research & Development 3,697 4,470 5,915 6,024 7,665 9,822 10,311 9,878 9,768 10,318 11,627 11,449 12,411 12,798 13,999 16,208
Depreciation & Amortization 279 459 329 157 185 224 276 324 361 392 423 461 492 526 559 597
Other/ Unusual Operating Expenses/ (Income) 263 388 -990 -63 -81 -103 -108 -104 -103 -108 -122 -120 -130 -135 -147 -170
Total Operating Expenses 6,544 7,975 7,880 9,426 11,979 15,337 16,139 15,521 15,390 16,267 18,313 18,077 19,587 20,217 22,098 25,535
EBIT 2,292 2,816 4,662 4,429 5,649 7,252 7,572 7,195 7,074 7,461 8,427 8,254 8,954 9,215 10,096 11,739
Interest Expenses 371 545 557 533 526 629 765 790 752 735 760 834 809 858 869 932
Interest Income 80 113 153 157 147 187 240 251 241 238 252 284 279 303 312 341
Net Interest Expenses/ (Income) 291 432 404 376 379 442 525 538 511 497 508 551 530 556 557 590
Other non operating Income/ (Expenses) 23 -12 56 28 35 45 47 45 45 47 53 52 57 58 64 74
EBT 2,024 2,372 4,314 4,081 5,305 6,855 7,094 6,701 6,607 7,012 7,971 7,755 8,481 8,718 9,604 11,223
Taxes 422 373 1,374 930 1,186 1,523 1,590 1,511 1,486 1,567 1,770 1,733 1,880 1,935 2,120 2,465
Net income 1,602 1,999 2,940 3,151 4,119 5,332 5,504 5,191 5,122 5,445 6,202 6,022 6,601 6,782 7,483 8,758
2015(A) 2016(A) 2017(A) 2018(F) 2019(F) 2020(F) 2021(F) 2022(F) 2023(F) 2024(F) 2025(F) 2026(F) 2027(F) 2028(F) 2029(F) 2030(F)
Cash and Short Term Investments 6,552 7,970 12,042 11,274 14,344 18,381 19,295 18,485 18,280 19,308 21,759 21,426 23,225 23,950 26,198 30,332
Receivables 1,421 1,878 2,103 2,321 2,953 3,784 3,972 3,805 3,763 3,975 4,480 4,411 4,781 4,931 5,393 6,244
Inventory 443 498 541 647 823 1,054 1,107 1,060 1,048 1,107 1,248 1,229 1,332 1,374 1,503 1,740
Prepaid Expenses 39 42 32 41 53 55 53 52 55 62 61 66 68 75 87
Other Current Assets 985 484 164 780 992 1,272 1,335 1,279 1,265 1,336 1,505 1,482 1,607 1,657 1,812 2,098
Current Assets 9,401 10,869 14,892 15,022 19,113 24,492 25,709 24,629 24,357 25,727 28,992 28,548 30,945 31,912 34,906 40,414
Total PPE 814 930 1,070 1,267 1,530 1,882 2,211 2,466 2,678 2,891 3,149 3,359 3,595 3,819 4,080 4,433
Goodwill 4,879 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866
Intangibles 10,858 10,392 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436 8,436
Other Long Term Assets 1,012 1,031 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877
Long Term Assets 17,563 17,219 15,249 15,446 15,709 16,061 16,390 16,645 16,857 17,070 17,328 17,538 17,774 17,998 18,259 18,612
Total Assets 26,964 28,088 30,141 30,467 34,822 40,553 42,099 41,275 41,214 42,796 46,320 46,087 48,719 49,909 53,166 59,026
2015(A) 2016(A) 2017(A) 2018(F) 2019(F) 2020(F) 2021(F) 2022(F) 2023(F) 2024(F) 2025(F) 2026(F) 2027(F) 2028(F) 2029(F) 2030(F)
Accounts Payable 241 247 305 346 440 564 592 567 561 592 667 657 712 734 803 930
Accrued Expenses 1,643 2,115 2,422 2,680 3,410 4,370 4,587 4,395 4,346 4,591 5,173 5,094 5,522 5,694 6,229 7,211
Current Port. Of LT Debt/ Capital Leases 501
Other Current Liabilities 85 97 260 182 231 297 311 298 295 312 351 346 375 386 423 489
Current Liabilities 1,969 2,960 2,987 3,208 4,082 5,230 5,491 5,260 5,202 5,494 6,192 6,097 6,609 6,815 7,455 8,631
Long Term Debt 14,161 13,789 15,838 15,628 18,697 22,746 23,482 22,369 21,854 22,600 24,806 24,065 25,526 25,831 27,700 31,508
Deferred Income Tax 2,519 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327
Other Liabilities 2,396 4,739 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068 3,068
Long Term Liabilities 19,076 18,528 20,233 20,023 23,092 27,141 27,877 26,764 26,249 26,995 29,201 28,460 29,921 30,226 32,095 35,903
Total Liabilities 21,045 21,488 23,220 23,231 27,174 32,372 33,368 32,024 31,451 32,489 35,393 34,557 36,530 37,041 39,550 44,534
Common Stock 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Additional Paid in Capital 11,119 12,378 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806 13,806
Retained Earnings 8,074 10,074 13,061 13,376 13,788 14,321 14,872 15,391 15,903 16,447 17,067 17,670 18,330 19,008 19,756 20,632
Common Treasury Stock -14,052 -16,821 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243 -20,243
accumulated other comprehensive income 768 419 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287
Total Equity 5,918 6,060 6,921 7,236 7,648 8,181 8,732 9,251 9,763 10,307 10,927 11,530 12,190 12,868 13,616 14,492
Total Liabilities & Equity 26,963 27,548 30,141 30,467 34,822 40,553 42,099 41,275 41,214 42,796 46,320 46,087 48,719 49,909 53,166 59,026
2015(A) 2016(A) 2017(A) 2018(F) 2019(F) 2020(F) 2021(F) 2022(F) 2023(F) 2024(F) 2025(F) 2026(F) 2027(F) 2028(F) 2029(F) 2030(F)
Revenue (All Products & Candidates) 9,256 11,229 13,003 14,431 18,361 23,529 24,698 23,661 23,399 24,715 27,852 27,426 29,729 30,657 33,534 38,825
EBIT 2,292 2,816 4,662 4,429 5,649 7,252 7,572 7,195 7,074 7,461 8,427 8,254 8,954 9,215 10,096 11,739
    Tax rate on EBIT 18.41% 13.25% 29.47% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38% 20.38%
Tax on EBIT 422 373 1374 902 1151 1478 1543 1466 1441 1520 1717 1682 1825 1878 2057 2392
EBIAT/ NOPLAT 1,870 2,443 3,288 3,526 4,498 5,774 6,029 5,729 5,633 5,941 6,710 6,572 7,130 7,337 8,039 9,347
(+) D&A 409 505 471 157 185 224 276 324 361 392 423 461 492 526 559 597
( - ) CAPEX 286 236 279 353 449 576 604 579 573 605 682 671 728 750 821 950
Inc. Receivable -995 457 225 218 632 831 188 -167 -42 212 505 -69 370 149 463 851
Inc. Inventory 50 55 43 106 176 232 52 -46 -12 59 141 -19 103 42 129 237
Inc. Prepaid Expenses 39 3 -10 9 12 3 -2 -1 3 7 -1 5 2 6 12
Inc. Other current Assets -501 -320 616 212 279 63 -56 -14 71 170 -23 124 50 155 286
Inc. Accounts Payable 43 6 58 41 94 124 28 -25 -6 32 75 -10 55 22 69 127
Inc Accrued Expenses 472 307 258 730 960 217 -193 -49 244 583 -79 428 172 534 983
Inc. Other Current Liabilities 12 163 -78 50 65 15 -13 -3 17 40 -5 29 12 36 67
( - ) Increase in Operating Working Capital -988 -440 -577 709 156 205 46 -41 -10 52 124 -17 91 37 114 210
FCFF from Operations 2,981 3,152 4,057 2,621 4,078 5,218 5,654 5,514 5,431 5,676 6,327 6,379 6,803 7,076 7,663 8,785
FCFF from non operating activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FCFF 2,981 3,152 4,057 2,621 4,078 5,218 5,654 5,514 5,431 5,676 6,327 6,379 6,803 7,076 7,663 8,785
WACC 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 9.11%
Discounted FCFF 2,402 3,426 4,018 3,990 3,567 3,220 3,084 3,151 2,911 2,846 2,713 2,693 2,830
Discounted Perpetuity Value 39,823

















CD19: JCAR017 $997 mn $679 mn $838 mn $2,247 mn $2,643 mn -$441 mn
CD19: Liso-cel (Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia) $232 mn $258 mn $245 mn $650 mn $738 mn -$157 mn
WT-1: JTCR016 (Acute Myeloid Leukemia) $473 mn $539 mn $506 mn $1,018 mn $512 mn
WT-1: JTCR016 (Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer) $68 mn $66 mn $67 mn $196 mn $129 mn
WT-1: JTCR016 (Mesothelioma) $5 mn -$8 mn -$1 mn $16 mn $17 mn
CD19: Liso-cel (Non-Hodgkins Lymphoma) $85 mn $121 mn $103 mn $321 mn $367 mn -$58 mn
CD19: JCAR014 with Durvalumab (Non-hodgkin Lymphoma) $85 mn $121 mn $103 mn $333 mn $381 mn -$56 mn
CD22: JCAR018 Fully-Human scFv  (Non-hodgkin Lymphoma) $85 mn $121 mn $103 mn $321 mn $367 mn -$58 mn
BCMA: JCARH125  (Multiple Myeloma) $226 mn $343 mn $285 mn $1,009 mn $724 mn
BCMA: MCARH171 & FCARH143  (Multiple Myeloma) $226 mn $343 mn $285 mn $1,009 mn $724 mn
L1CAM: JCAR023  (Pediatric Neuroblastoma) $536 mn $832 mn $684 mn $2,380 mn $1,696 mn
MUC16 & IL-12: JCAR020 "Armored" CAR (Ovarian) $660 mn $1,027 mn $844 mn $2,932 mn $2,088 mn
ROR1: JCAR024 (Non-small cell lung cancer/ breast cancer) $381 mn $586 mn $483 mn $1,684 mn $1,200 mn
Lewis Y (Solid Tumors) $1,328 mn $2,082 mn $1,705 mn $5,915 mn $4,210 mn
TOTAL without product cannibalization: $4,392 mn $6,431 mn $6,250 mn $3,872 mn $20,653 mn $10,532 mn
TOTAL with product cannibalization: $3,805 mn $5,554 mn $4,679 mn $971 mn $15,412 mn $9,762 mn




Alford, A. W. (1992) ‘The Effect of the Set of Comparable Firms on the Accuracy of the Price-
Earnings Valuation Method’, Journal of Accounting Research, 30(1), pp. 94–108. 
Alles, M. (2018a) Celgene Completes Acquisition of Juno Therapeutics , Inc ., Advancing Global 
Leadership in Cellular Immunotherapy. 
Alles, M. (2018b) Celgene Corporation Announces Changes to Its Board of Directors. 
Backer, R. De and Ruby, T. (2017) ‘Biopharma valuations — onward and upward?’, (Exhibit 1), pp. 
1–11. 
Bhojraj, S. and Lee, C. M. C. (2002) ‘Who is my peer? A valuation-based approach to the selection 
of comparable firms’, Journal of Accounting Research, 40(2), pp. 407–439. doi: 10.1111/1475-
679X.00055. 
Black, F. and Scholes, M. (1973) ‘The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 81(3), pp. 637–654. doi: 10.1086/260062. 
Brito, P. (2017) The Method of Market Multiples on the Valuation of Companies : A Multivariate 
Approach, FEP Working Papers. 
Bruner, R. F. (2005) ‘Where M & A Strays and Where it Pays’, Wiley and Sons, (January), pp. 1–54. 
Campbell, T. (2017) Can This Tiny Biotech Stock Pay Off Big for Celgene? Available at: 
https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/11/17/can-this-tiny-biotech-stock-pay-off-big-for-celgen.aspx 
(Accessed: 20 May 2018). 
Celgene Corporation (2017a) Celgene Company Presentation at the 37th Annual Cowen Health Care 
Conference. Boston. Available at: http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-
262QUJ/6284057589x0x932199/AC036424-C2E6-460D-8270-
7CA69D414313/Celgene_Cowen_03_08_17_FINAL_without_notes.pdf. 
Celgene Corporation (2017b) Celgene Corporation and bluebird bio Announce bb2121 Anti-BCMA 
CAR-T Cell Therapy Has Been Granted Breakthrough Therapy Designation from FDA and Prime 
Eligibility from EMA for Relapsed and Refractory Multiple Myeloma (NASDAQ:CELG), Celgene. 
Summit, New Jersey. Available at: http://ir.celgene.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=1049014. 
Celgene Corporation (2018a) Bluebird Bio and Celgene Corporation Enter into Agreement to Co-
Develop and Co-Promote Anti-BCMA CAR T Cell Therapy bb2121 in the United States. Summit, 
New Jersey. 
Celgene Corporation (2018b) Celgene Announces Expiration of Cash Tender Offer for Shares of. 
Summit, New Jersey. Available at: http://ir.celgene.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=1059597. 
Celgene Corporation (2018c) Celgene Company History. Available at: 
https://www.celgene.com/about/history/. 
Celgene Corporation (2018d) Celgene Completes Acquisition of Juno Therapeutics , Inc ., Advancing 
Global Leadership in Cellular Immunotherapy. 
Celgene Corporation (2018e) Celgene Corporation Announces Changes to Its Board of Directors. 
Summit, New Jersey. Available at: http://ir.celgene.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=1064316. 
67 
 
Celgene Corporation (2018f) Celgene Corporation Form 10-K (annual report 2017). Delaware: 
United States securities and exchange commission. 
Celgene Corporation (2018g) Celgene Corporation to Acquire Juno Therapeutics, Inc., Advancing 
Global Leadership in Cellular Immunotherapy. Summit, New Jersey. 
Celgene Corporation (2018h) Celgene Landing Page. Available at: http://www.celgene.com/ 
(Accessed: 22 April 2018). 
Cooper, I. a. et al. (2008) ‘Optimal Equity Valuation Using Multiples: The Number of Comparable 
Firms’, Working paper, pp. 1–31. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1272349. 
Countryeconomy.com (2018) G8 Major Economies. Available at: 
https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/g8 (Accessed: 1 May 2018). 
Crow, D., Hancock, T. and Xueqiao, W. (2018) ‘Healthcare: Cancer breakthrough leads China’s 
biotech boom’, Financial Times, pp. 1–9. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/30b5a944-3b57-
11e8-b9f9-de94fa33a81e. 
CVS Health Corporation (2018) CVS Health 2017 Annual Report. Woonsocket. doi: 
10.1080/10598650.2007.11510575. 
Damodaran, A. (2002) Investment Valuation. second edi. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Damodaran, A. (2015) ‘The Value of Synergy’, Damodaran on Valuation, (October), pp. 541–574. 
doi: 10.1002/9781119201786.ch15. 
DeChesare, B. (2016) Breaking into Wall street - Merger Model Guide. 
DePamphilis, D. M. (2014) Mergers, Acquisitions, and other Restructuring Activities. Seventh Ed. 
San Diego: Elsevier Inc. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-385487-2.00019-2. 
Devos, E., Kadapakkam, P. R. and Krishnamurthy, S. (2009) ‘How do mergers create value? A 
comparison of taxes, market power, and efficiency improvements as explanations for synergies’, 
Review of Financial Studies, 22(3), pp. 1179–1211. doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhn019. 
Eccles, R. G., Lanes, K. L. and Wilson, T. C. (1999) ‘Are you paying too much for that acquistion?’, 
Hbr, (July-August), pp. 136–146. 
Fernández, P. (2007) ‘Valuing companies by cash flow discounting: ten methods and nine theories’, 
Managerial Finance, 33(11), pp. 853–876. doi: 10.1108/03074350710823827. 
Fortune (2015) Juno Therapeutics â€TM Shares Sink After 2 More Deaths in Leukemia Drug Trial. 
Available at: http://fortune.com/2016/11/23/juno-therapeutics-leukemia-drug/. 
Gilead Sciences Inc. (2017a) Gilead Sciences Completes Acquisition of Kite Pharma, Inc. 
Gilead Sciences Inc. (2017b) Gilead Sciences to acquire Kite Pharma for $11.9 billion. Available at: 
http://www.gilead.com/news/press-releases/2017/8/gilead-sciences-to-acquire-kite-pharma-for-119-
billion. 
Global Data (2016) Glioblastoma Treatment Market: $3.3 Billion by 2024. Available at: 
https://www.pharmpro.com/news/2016/01/glioblastoma-treatment-market-33-billion-2024. 




(Accessed: 1 May 2018). 
Global Market Insights (2017) Breast Cancer Therapeutics Market Size By Product. Available at: 
https://www.gminsights.com/industry-analysis/breast-cancer-therapeutics-market (Accessed: 1 May 
2018). 
Goedhart, M., Koller, T. and Wessels, D. (2005) ‘The right Role for Multiples in Valuation’, 
McKinsey on Finance, 15, pp. 7–11. 
Goonewardene, A. and Rye, B. (2018) Bloomberg Intelligence Global Biotech 2018 Outlook. 
Grand View Research (2016) Multiple Myeloma Therapeutics Market To Be Worth $37.5 Billion By 
2024. Available at: https://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/global-multiple-myeloma-
therapeutics-market (Accessed: 1 May 2018). 
Grand View Research (2018) Pediatric Vaccines Market Analysis By Type (Monovalent, 
Multivalent), By Technology (Live Attenuated, Inactivated, Subunit, Toxoid, Conjugate), By 
Application (Infectious Diseases, Cancer, Allergy), By Region, And Segment Forecasts, 2018 - 2025. 
Available at: https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/pediatric-vaccine-market 
(Accessed: 1 May 2018). 
Healy, P. M. et al. (1990) ‘Does Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers?’, National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Hey, S. P. and Kesselheim, A. S. (2016) The FDA, Juno Therapeutics, and the ethical imperative of 
transparency, BMJ (Clinical research ed.). doi: 10.1136/bmj.i4435. 
Inselbag, I. and Kaufold, H. (1997) ‘Two DCF Approaches for Valuing Companies Under Alternative 
Financing Strategies (and How to Choose Between Them)’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
10(1), pp. 114–122. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6622.1997.tb00132.x. 
International Trade Administration (2016) ‘Top Markets Report Pharmaceuticals Overview and Key 
Findings’, Top Markets Report pharmaceuticals, pp. 1–10. Available at: 
http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Pharmaceuticals_Executive_Summary.pdf. 
Jadhav, R. (2018) Global Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma Therapeutics Market 2018-2023. Available at: 
https://thetechnicalprogress.com/2018/05/global-non-hodgkin-lymphoma-therapeutics-market-
2018-2023/ (Accessed: 11 May 2018). 
Janiszewski, S. (2011) ‘How to Perform Discounted Cash Flow Valuation?’, Foundations of 
Management, 3(1), pp. 81–96. doi: 10.2478/v10238-012-0037-4. 
Juno Therapeutics Inc. (2015) Celgene and Juno Announce Ten-Year Collaboration to Advance 
Potentially Groundbreaking Immunotherapies for Patients with Cancer and Autoimmune Diseases. 
Available at: http://ir.junotherapeutics.com/news-releases/news-release-details/celgene-and-juno-
announce-ten-year-collaboration-advance. 
Juno Therapeutics Inc. (2018) Juno Therapeutics , Inc . Form 10-K (annual report 2017). Delaware: 
United States securities and exchange commission. 
Kaplan, S. and Ruback, R. (1996) ‘The market pricing of cash flow forecasts: Discounted cash flow 




Kasimov, C. (2018) Celgene Overweight Previous: Not Rated CELG, CELG US Moving to an OW 
Rating and a $110 Price Target from Not Rated. JP Morgan Equity Research. 
Keegan, K. D. (2008) Biotechnology Valuation-An Introductory Guide. Chichester: John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd. doi: 10.1002/9781118673508. 
Kellogg, D., Charnes, J. M. and Demirer, R. (2000) ‘Valuation of a Biotechnology Firm: An 
Application of Real-Options Methodologies’, Financial Analysts Journal, 56(3), pp. 76–84. 
Kim, T. (2018) Celgene plunges 18% after biotech company slashes 2020 guidance; worst drop in 
17 years. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/26/celgene-plunges-after-the-biotech-
company-slashes-2020-guidance.html (Accessed: 17 April 2018). 
Kochenderfer, J. N. et al. (2010) ‘Eradication of B-lineage cells and regression of lymphoma in a 
patient treated with autologous T cells genetically engineered to recognize Brief report Eradication 
of B-lineage cells and regression of lymphoma in a patient treated with autologous T cells’, American 
Society of Hematology, 116(20), pp. 4099–4102. doi: 10.1182/blood-2010-04-281931. 
Kolaczkowski, L. (2017) A Look Inside MS Marketplace Projections. Available at: 
https://multiplesclerosisnewstoday.com/2017/09/28/ms-therapies-look-inside-market-research-
report/. 
Lawrence, S. (2016) Jounce nabs first big deal in $2.6B I/O tie-up with Celgene. Available at: 
https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/jounce-nabs-first-big-deal-2-6b-i-o-tie-up-celgene. 
Leland, H. (2005) ‘On Purely Financial Synergies : Implications for Mergers and Structured Finance 
Presentation to the Q-Group’. 
Leukemia and Lymphomia Society (LLS) (2017) Facts and Statistics. Available at: 
https://www.lls.org/http%3A/llsorg.prod.acquia-sites.com/facts-and-statistics/facts-and-statistics-
overview/facts-and-statistics (Accessed: 18 May 2018). 
Liu, J., Nissim, D. and Thomas, J. (2002) ‘Equity valuation using multiples’, Journal of Accounting 
Research, 40(1), pp. 135–172. doi: 10.1111/1475-679X.00042. 
Lolic, M. (2017) ‘NDA at the FDA’, U.S. Food & Drug Administration. 
Luehrman, T. A. (1997) ‘Using APV: A Better Tool for Valuing Operations’, Harvard Business 
Review, May-June(May-June 1997). 
MacKay, K. and Zheng, H. (2017) RBC - Luspatercept is a De-Risked Blockbuster, but St Agrees: 
Initiating at Sector Perform. Available at: 
https://www.investorvillage.com/smbd.asp?mb=341&mn=212593&pt=msg&mid=17527100 
(Accessed: 10 May 2018). 
Messer, C. (2018) Juno Therapeutics, Inc. (JUNO) Celgene Takeover Announced at $87/share. 
Downgrading to Neutral. Needham & Company Equity Research. 
Myers, S. and Howe, C. (1997) ‘A Life-Cycle Financial Model of Pharmaceutical R&D’, Program 
on the Pharmaceutical Industry, MIT. 
Van Norman, G. A. (2016a) ‘Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1: An Overview of Approval 




Van Norman, G. A. (2016b) ‘Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 2’, JACC: Basic to Translational 
Science. Elsevier, 1(4), pp. 277–287. doi: 10.1016/j.jacbts.2016.03.009. 
Persistent Market Research (2017) Global Market Study on Malignant Mesothelioma: Cisplatin and 
Combination Segment Projected to be the Second Most Lucrative Segment by Drug Type. Available 
at: https://www.persistencemarketresearch.com/market-research/malignant-mesothelioma-
market.asp (Accessed: 1 May 2018). 
Pinto, J. et al. (2010) Equity Asset Valuation. second edi. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. 
Reed, S. F., Lajoux, A. R. and Nesvold, H. P. (2007) The Art of M&A, Fourth Edition: A Merger 
Acquisition Buyout Guide. doi: 10.1036/0071403027. 
Roberts, A., Wallace, W. and Moles, P. (2016) ‘Mergers and Acquisitions’, Edinburgh Business 
School, 2016(1020), p. 29. doi: 10.1108/eb039093. 
Rohan, S. (2018a) MarketsandMarkets: Acute Myeloid Leukemia Therapeutics Market in G8 
Countries worth $1.67 Billion by 2020. Available at: 
https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/acute-myeloid-leukemia-therapeutics.asp 
(Accessed: 1 May 2018). 
Rohan, S. (2018b) MarketsandMarkets: Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia Therapeutics Market worth 
$2.2 Billion by 2020. Available at: https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/chronic-
lymphocytic.asp (Accessed: 1 May 2018). 
Sanofi Corporation (2018) Sanofi Completes Acquisition of Bioverativ Inc. Paris. 
Schreiner, A. (2007) Equity valuation using multiples: An empirical investigation. University of St. 
Gallen. doi: 10.1007/978-3-8350-9531-1. 
Shrieves, R. E. and Wachowicz, J. M. (2001) ‘Free cash flow (FCF), economic value added (EVATM), 
and net present value (NPV): A reconciliation of variations of discounted-cash-flow (DCF) 
valuation’, Engineering Economist, 46(1), pp. 33–52. 
Simoes, S. (2014) Bluepharma - we are a partner that cares. Available at: 
https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/Sept 10 - Company Presentation - 14h45 - BluePharma.pdf 
(Accessed: 5 May 2018). 
Staines, R. (2018) Bluebird bio details plans to file three blockbusters. Available at: 
https://pharmaphorum.com/news/bluebird-bio-aims/ (Accessed: 5 May 2018). 
Statista (2018a) Prescription drug expenditure in the United States from 1960 to 2018 (in billion U.S. 
dollars). Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/184914/prescription-drug-expenditures-in-
the-us-since-1960/. 
Statista (2018b) Top 10 cancer drugs worldwide by revenue in 2016 (in billion U.S. dollars). 
Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/288538/top-cancer-drugs-based-on-revenue/ 
(Accessed: 1 May 2018). 
Statista (2018c) Top 10 pharmaceutical companies based on global oncology market share in 2016 




Supid, S. (2015) Increasing Incidences of Glioblastoma Multiforme Propels the Growth of Global 
Glioblastoma Treatment Market, Expected to Reach USD 0.91 Billion in 2022. Available at: 
https://www.transparencymarketresearch.com/pressrelease/global-glioblastoma-treatment-
market.htm. 
Tatkare, D. (2015) Oncology/Cancer Drugs Market by Therapeutic Modalities (Chemotherapy, 
Targeted Therapy, Immunotherapy, Hormonal), Cancer Types (Blood, Breast, Gastrointestinal , 
Prostate, Skin, Respiratory/Lung Cancer) - Global Opportunity Analysis and Industry Forecast,. 
Allied Market Research. Available at: https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/oncology-cancer-
drugs-market. 
The World Bank (2016) Population growth (annual %). Available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW (Accessed: 1 May 2018). 
U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) (2017) ‘Tisagenlecleucel BLA Approval’. United States of 
America: U.S. Food & Drug Administration. Available at: www.fda.gov. 
U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) (2018a) Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and 
Exclusivity. Available at: 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm. 
U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) (2018b) The FDA Drug Approval Process (Infographic). 
Available at: https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm284393.pdf. 
Visiongain Ltd. (2017) Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer (NSCLC) Drugs Market Forecast 2017-2027. 
Available at: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/non-small-cell-lung-cancer-nsclc-drugs-
market-forecast-2017-2027-635385943.html. 
Wood, L. (2018) Systemic Lupus Erythematosus Market Report 2018: Insights, Epidemiology and 
Forecasts to 2027. Available at: 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180222006552/en/Systemic-Lupus-Erythematosus-
Market-Report-2018-Insight. 
Wood, S. F. et al. (2017) ‘Influence of pharmaceutical marketing on Medicare prescriptions in the 
District of Columbia’, PLOS one, pp. 1–13. Available at: 
https://doi.org/%0A10.1371/journal.pone.0186060. 
 
 
